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Abstract
In  1998 the Government  of Malawi  decided to reform  its  liberalized entry in value-added  and Internet services.
telecommunications  sector. Although  the reform was  However, the Government  had neither privatized  the
ambitious in  some ways,  it was modest when compared  fixed-line telecommunications  operator nor introduced
with  the most ambitious reforms adopted elsewhere  in  competition in  fixed-line services  by the end of 2002.
Sub-Saharan  Africa. The two main accomplishments  Clarke,  Gebreab,  and Mgombelo  discuss sector
were splitting the incumbent  fixed line monopoly, the  performance  before reform, details of the reform, the
Malawi  Post and Telecommunications  Corporation,  into  political  motivation for reform,  and events  in the five
two companies-Malawi  Telecommunications  Limited  years  following the reform. The reform  yielded  mixed
(MTL)  and Malawi Post Corporation (MPC)-and  results. Although  cellular penetration  and Internet  use
issuing two new cellular  licenses to two new private  expanded  dramatically following  reform, prices
entrants.  In addition,  the Government also established  a  increased, especially  for cellular calls, and fixed-line
new regulator  which was separate  from, but heavily  penetration  remains low by regional  standards.
dependent on, the Ministry  of Information and
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VIII.  TABLES  55zI.  IN TRODUCTION
Less than a decade ago, telecommunications  sectors throughout Sub-Saharan Africa were
dominated by state-owned monopolies.  Although many countries had licensed cellular providers
- who,  in practice,  were  often the  same monopoly company that provided  fixed line  service -
competition was  rare even  in cellular telephony  and virtually unknown  in fixed line telephony.
By the  end of 2002, this picture  had changed dramatically.  Technological  change,  combined
with changed  views on the  potential  for  competition,  has resulted in many countries  licensing
additional  cellular providers  and  some  even allowing  competition  in fixed line  service (e.g.,  in
Uganda).  Further,  many  countries  have  privatized  formerly  state-owned  enterprises  and
established independent regulators.
Although some features  of reform have been similar across countries, other aspects have
differed  dramatically.  Documenting  and  studying  the  successes  and  failures  related  to  these
different  reform attempts in order to identify which aspects of reform have worked, which have
not, and to identify the political  and institutional  constraints that affect success  is, therefore,  an
important step in designing and guiding future reforms.  To this end, this study is part of a larger
research  program  analyzing  the regulatory,  legal,  political  and  institutional  factors  that  have
influenced  the  outcome  of reform.  The  research  program  attempts  to  do this through detailed
analyses  of  reforms  in  six  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  Cote  d'Ivoire  (Laffont  and
N'Guessan,  2002);  Ghana  (Haggarty  et al.,  2003), Malawi  (this  paper);  Senegal  (Azam  et al.,
2002), Tanzania (Haggarty et al., 2002) and Uganda (Shirley et al., 2002).
In  comparison  to the  other  case-study  countries,  the Malawian  Government  adopted  a
relatively  modest  reform  program,  several  years  after  reform  was  initiated  elsewhere.  The
incumbent operator, Malawi Posts and Telecommunications  Corporation (MPTC) was split into
two entities, Malawi Telecom Limited  (MTL) and Malawi Posts Corporation (MPC).  However,
MTL  continued  operating  as  the  monopoly provider  of fixed-line  services  and,  after  a  failed
attempt  at privatization, remained  state-owned.  In addition, a second cellular license was issued
in  1998  (and  a third  in 2002),  introducing  competition  in this  segment  of the market,  which
previously  had been  dominated by  the  single  incumbent-owned  cellular  provider.  Finally,  the
law established  a  new  regulatory  agency,  which  is housed outside  of the incumbent  operator,
3which  was  responsible  for  regulation  before  reform.  However,  the  Minister  of Information
retains considerable  influence over the regulator.
The impact of the reform was quite modest by the end of 2002.  Rapid growth of cellular
telephony,  which  took  place  after  the  new  cellular  operator  entered  the  market,  ocdurred.
However,  fixed-line  penetration  did not grow  as quickly as hoped and, at the  end of 2002, was
lower than  originally targeted.  Furthermore,  cellular  prices  increased  dramatically  as  soon  as
they were  freed from regulation.  Finally, noisy disputes between  the new  cellular operator and
the regulator raised questions about the impartiality and independence  of the regulatory regime.
The  paper is organized  as  follows.  In the  next  section,  we  discuss  sector organization
before reform.  In Section  III, we discuss the reform  itself, focusing on the effect of reform  on
regulatory institutions  and privatization and competition.  In Section IV, we discuss the political
factors that affected the extent and design of reform.  In Section V, we describe the outcome  of
reform and in Section VI, we conclude.
RI.  SECTOR CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE REFORM
lULl  Sector organization.
Before  sector  reform  in  1998/99,  the  state-owned  operator,  Malawi  Posts  and
Telecommunications  (MPTC)  dominated  the  telecommunications  sector  in  Malawi.  The
incumbent operator had a monopoly over local and long-distance  fixed-line service, had the only
international  gateway and was a part owner of the only cellular provider and the  only Internet
Service Provider  (ISP) in Malawi.  In addition,  it had a monopoly over the provision of postal
services  and was responsible for most communication sector regulation.
MPTC,  which had previously  operated  as  a department of the Ministry  of Information,
Broadcasting,  Post  and  Telecommunications,  was  corporatized  in  January  1995.  Its  board
consisted  of a chairman,  appointed  by  the  Minister of Information,  three  ex-officio  members
from the Government,  and five other members  also appointed  by the Minister.  Board members
usually  served  two-year  terrns,  but  the  Minister  could  terminate  their  appointments  for  any
reason at any time.  The board appointed the Post Master General, the Chief Executive Officer of
MPTC.
4The primary reason  for the  government's  decision  to corporatize  MPTC was that it had
agreed  to  as  one  of the  conditions  of  a  sector  loan  from  the  African  Development  Bank.'
However,  at  this  time,  it  would  have  been  very  unlikely  that  the  Government  would  have
attempted  a  more  ambitious  sector reform.  First, Malawi had  relatively  low  credibility  with
foreign  investors.  For  example,  Malawi  was ranked  lower on the  International  Country  Risk
Guide,  a commercial  index  commonly  used  by  international  investors,  than  any  of the  early
reformers  were  (e.g.,  Ghana,  C6te  d'Ivoire,  and Tanzania).2 The  low ranking reflected  the fact
that Malawi had started the democratization  process  only recently - after thirty years of single-
party  rule  and very  tight  state  control  over  the  country,  in  general,  and  the  communications
sector,  in  particular.  Second,  at this  time,  bolder reforms,  such as  introducing  competition  or
privatizing  state-owned  operators,  were  relatively  rare  in Africa.  By  1994,  of 42  countries  in
Sub-Saharan Africa for which data is available, only 4 had privatized  state-owned  operators  and
only 2 had introduced competition even in cellular.3 Malawi's history of tight state control made
it very unlikely that Malawi  would be  a leader in this respect  and,  therefore,  it is not surprising
that the Government responded with a relatively modest reform.4
As  well  as  corporatizing  MPTC,  the Government  also  licensed Malawi's  first  cellular
operator in  1995.  The new operator, Telekom Networks Malawi  (TNM),  was 40 percent  owned
by MPTC  and  60  percent  owned  by Malaysia  Telekom.  Although  this  might  not  seem  very
ambitious, it is worth noting that many countries  in Sub-Saharan Africa did not introduce cellular
until even later.  By  1995,  cellular operators  were providing services  in 25 Sub-Saharan  African
Field interview with Post Master General of MPTC (October  1999).
2 A higher score on the scale indicates a more favorable environment  for investment,  while  a lower  score indicates a
less favorable one.  Malawi  scored 4.90 points on this scale in  1994 compared to 6.53  for Tanzania,  6.33 for Ghana,
and 6.27 for C6te d'lvoire.
The  42  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  are  the  countries  covered  in  International  Telecommunication  Union
(1998ia).
5countries  (including  Malawi)  compared  to  24  where  no  cellular  operators  were  operating  -
although several additional countries had already licensed new entrants by this time.  Further, it
was relatively common for the incumbent  to either provide cellular  services  directly or for it to
partially or completely own the cellular provider.5 Before reform, TNM paid only about Kwacha
5,000-7,000/year  (US$327-$458  at the end of 1995  and US$236-$330  at the end of 1997)  in
license fees.  Further, TNM was assigned all frequencies in the GSM900 band.
In  addition  to  being  the  monopoly  provider  of  local  fixed-line,  long-distance  and
international  services  and the part owner of the monopoly provider of cellular services,  Malawi
Post  and  Telecommunications  Corporation  (MPTC)  was  involved  in  many  other  subsectors.
Although TV Malawi did not start broadcasting until after being separated from MPTC, it was a
sub-project  within MPTC  before reform.  In addition, MPTC  owned  50 percent  of MalawiNet,
which was the sole full service Internet  Service Provider (ISP) before reform.6
In  addition  to  being  the  sole  provider  of  these  services,  Malawi  Posts  and
Telecommunications  Corporation  (MPTC)  was also responsible for most regulatory  functions.
MPTC was responsible for the licensing  operators in all areas  of telecommunications  (e.g., ISPs
and cellular companies),  spectrum  frequency allocation,  type  approval for equipment,  technical
standards  and  numbering  plans.  The  sector  ministry  appointed  a  majority  of MPTC  board
4The  govemment's  policy  of  maintaining  tight  control  over  the  media  also  made  liberalization  of
telecommunications  unlikely  before  democratization.  Although  less  political  threatening  than  reform  of
broadcasting,  technological  change  made even  telecommunications  reform  politically  difficult  since  reducing  the
cost  and increasing  the  availability  of communications  tends  to reduce  the  governnent's  power  over information.
One  striking example  of this in Malawi is that as pressure for democratization  in Malawi increased,  groups opposed
to  President Banda's  single-party rule circulated  anonymous  letters criticizing the  government  using fax machines
(Newell,  1995, p. 244).  Technologies  that have  developed recently  such as the Internet  would make  it even more
difficult for the government to maintain its monopoly over information in the presence of reform.
5For example,  among the 42 countries covered  in International  Telecommunications  Union (1998a),  27 of the  37
countries with at least one cellular operator had an operator that was either partially or fully owned by the incumbent
in  1998.  Data  is  from  International  Telecommunications  Union  (1998a)  or  is  collected  from  the  Economist
Intelligence  Unit.
6 Epsilon and Omega also  provided an E-mail  service to about 250 subscribers by 1998 and Computer Solutions had
an e-mail  service  that had  been  operating  intermittently  since  1995.  UJNIMA,  an  e-mail  server,  was  based  at
Chancellor College  in Zomba.  Finally, Healthnet,  which  was based in the United  States, provided connections  for
health workers  at the Malawi College of Medicine (Article  19,  1998, p.  13).
6members,  approved  tariffs  proposed  by  MPTC,  and  was  responsible  for  planning  major
investments  and  making  procurement  decisions.  In  addition,  the  ministry  was  able  to more
generally intervene in MPTC activities and override its decisions.
Because MPTC  controlled licensing,  it was able to prevent entry by potential competitors
in several  areas  where competition  would have  been possible.  For example,  Article  19  (1998,
pp.  13-22)  describes  how MPTC  prevented other ISPs from  entering  the  Malawian  market by
either failing  to issue  licenses  or  failing to provide  them with lines  (since  ISPs  were  forbidden
from operating their own VSATs).  For example,  in 1987,  CompuServe/AOL  tried to enter the
Malawian  market  through  Societe  Internationale  des  Telecommunications  Aeronautique's
(SITA's)  communications  network.  However,  after  MPTC's joint  venture,  MalawiNet,  was
opened,  MPTC  threatened  to cut  SITA's  9600-byte  line and refused to upgrade  it to the 64KB
line that  S1TA was requesting unless  SITA  stopped providing CompuServe/AOL  with access to
its  line.  SITA eventually  complied  with MPTC's  request, cutting  CompuServe/AOL's  service
(Article  19, 1998).
Similarly,  the Sustainable Development Network Programme  (SDNP), which was wholly
owned  by  the  Malawian  government  and  was  provided  with  support  for  staff  salaries  and
equipment by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),  originally applied for a license
to  start  providing  Internet  Services  in  1996.  After  MalawiNet  started  providing  service  in
August  1997, MPTC  informed  SDNP that MalawiNet  had been awarded  a 60-month exclusivity
period.  Although  the  UNDP  had  signed  an  agreement  with  the  Government  in  1994,  and
complained to the Government about delays (Article  19,  1998,  p. 20), MPTC did not issue SDNP
with  a  license  until  December  1999.  By  this  time,  Parliament  had  passed  the  1998
Communications Act  and  had  approved  the  Communications Sector Policy Statement, which
liberalized data and Internet services  (Section 2.1.6.4).
MPTC  appears  to  have also  slowed  the  development  of other  services,  where  it  either
offered  services  that might  compete with  the  new  entrant  or when  it  thought  that  it might,  at
7The  Ministry  of Posts,  Telecommunication,  Information  and  Broadcasting  and Attorney  General's  Office  were
also involved in regulation.
7some future time, offer  competing  services.  For  example, although two  companies  applied for
licenses  to provide paging services,  MPTC refused  to  issue  a license  to  one  firm  and issued a
license but failed to allocate spectrum space to the other (Article  19, 1998, p. 9).
In  the  television  sector,  where  MPTC  owned  the  non-operational  TV  Malawi,
MultiChoice Malawi, which was originally owned by Lonrho but later was sold to Malawian and
Zimbabwean  investors,  applied for a  license to re-broadcast  several international  channels  (e.g.,
BBC  World  Service  and  a  South  African  Sports  Channel)  to  paying  consumers  and  a  free
channel  to  all  consumers  in  1994.  After agreeing  to broadcast one free  channel  in addition  to
three  channels  for  subscribers,  MMC  gained  the  support  for the  Ministry  of Information  and
applied  for a license.  In May  1998,  the Ministry of Information  gave MMC  permission to start
broadcasting.  However,  MPTC failed  to issue MMC  a license  and, consequently,  MMC  started
operating without a license.  By allowing firms to start operating without issuing formal licenses,
some  entry  was  possible.  However,  since  the  firms'  legal  positions  remained  uncertain,  this
policy probably inhibited investment and promoted short time horizons.
11.2  Access.
In  1985,  MPTC  had  0.27  lines
0.7  ____________________________________  for every  100 people, slightly lower than
0.6  _  _J_  the  average  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa
0.5  which  was  around  0.31  lines  per  100
0.4
0.3  inhabitants.  However,  the  difference
0.2  was  not  large,  especially  given  that
0.1  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  Malawi was more rural than the average
co,  co  co  0,  ,,  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa  - in  1985,  90 a,  a,  a,  a,7  on  r  cnF,a,a
-c-Malawi  -{-  Sub-Saharanfrca  percent  of  the  Malawian  population
lived  in  rural  areas  compared  to  75
Figure  1:  Fixed Lines per  100 inhabitants.
Source:  Intemational Telecommunication  Umon (2001)
However,  over  the  next  decade,
Malawi's  relative  performance  declined  and  by  1998,  service  penetration  was  low  even  by
regional  standards.  In  1998,  Malawi  had  0.34  main lines per  100  inhabitants  (see  Figure  1),
8compared  to  an average  of 0.57 lines for Sub-Saharan  Africa  (SSA),  1.97  for South Asia,  5.99
for North  Africa,  7.06  for East Asia  and  12.14  for  Latin America.  Low  coverage  rates  were
further aggravated by the recurrence of services outages due to poor system maintenance.  At this
time,  it  was  estimated  that  it  could  take  up  to  six  months  to have  a simple  telephone  fault
repaired.
Despite  the entry  of Telekom  Networks  Malawi  (TNM)  in  1995,  cellular  penetration
remained  very  low.  By  1998,  there  were  only  10,500  cellular  subscribers  in  Malawi,
representing  about  0.1  per  100  inhabitants.  In  part  this  was  the  result  of TNM's  policy  of
offering only post-paid  services,  which precluded  people who couldn't pay the required  deposit
and satisfy other conditions designed to ensure that they wouldn't be a credit risk from obtaining
services.  It also reflected  the low level of interconnection capacity between the fixed line and
cellular networks.
MPTC's  corporatization  in
35%  1995  failed  to  have  an  appreciable
30%  impact  on  access.  Annual  growth  of
25%  main  lines  had  averaged  6.1  percent
20%
20%  - TU  in  Malawi  between  1985  and  1990,
10%  _  compared  to  6.5  percent  for  Sub-
5%  Saharan  Africa  (SSA).  However,
over  the  1990s,  growth  slowed  in
0)  c,  o,  c  -E°  =E  Malawi.  Following  corporatization,
growth of main lines fell to an annual
ME1985-90  * 1990-95  131995-1998  1 l  l  1985-90 U 1990-95  01995-1998  rate  of  2.9  percent  in  Malawi,  as
Figure 2: Average  Annual Growth of Main Lines (In %)  growth  dramatically  accelerated  in
Source:  International Telecommunication  Union  (2001).  other  African  countries,  especially  in
' Sub-Saharan  Africa excludtng South Africa
early  reformers  such  as  Ghana  (see
Figure  2).  Although  MPTC  had  intended  to  connect  40,000  additional  main  lines  following
commercialization,  it only managed  to achieve  8 percent of its target  by the time of reform  in
1998.  This slow  growth meant that the number of mainlines per  100 inhabitants declined by 3
percent between  1995  and  1998, compared  to an increase of 35 percent  in SSA as a whole (see
9Figure  1).  The  failure  of MPTC's  corporatization  to improve  telephone  access  in Malawi  is
consistent  with  the  observation  that  performance  contracts  and  other  reforms  designed  to
improve the functioning of weak state-owned  enterprises rarely  succeed  in developing countries
(Shirley and Xu,  1998, 2001; World Bank,  1995).
The  low  service  penetration
35.0  was  not  due  to  lack  of  demand  -
30.0
25.0  MPTC  consistently  had long waitlists.
20.0  - By  1997,  it would  have taken MPTC
15.0/  about  25 years  to clear  its waiting list
10.0.  at  the  rate  of expansion  that  it  was
5.0 - managing  at that time (see  Figure  3).
0  - . In practice,  since many people  do not
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  bother to put their names on a waiting
Figure 3: Waiting Time for Telephone Connection (In Years)  list  when  there  is  an  extremely  low
Source: International Telecommunication  Union. (2001)  chance  of  actually  getting  a  phone,
Note:  Waiting  times  are  calculated  by dividing  the  waidist by  the  average
main lines growth over the previous three  yeas.  actual  demand  was  probably
considerably higher than the waiting  list suggests. For example,  Pyramid Research estimated that
total demand  in Malawi  was around 500,000  lines in  1997 (Economist Intelligence  Unit,  1999b)
- compared to only 36,574 operational  lines.
10Low  access  to
telecommunications  services  was
80%  aggravated  by  the  disparity  between
investment  in exchange  equipment  and
60%
investment in the transmission network.
40%  In the  late  80s, about 65  percent  of the
exchange  capacity  was  utilized.
20%
However,  this  level  fell  to  50 percent
0%  ..  ..  . ....  by  1998,  suggesting a large  asymmetry
2co  C  0Co
2  a,  5-  >between  investment in the local loop
Figure 4: MPTC/MTL - Utilized Exchange Capacity.  and investment  in exchange  equipment
Source: Intemational  Telecommunication Union (2001)  (See  Figure  4).  Rampant  cable  theft,
which  forced  President  Bakili  Muluzi
to warn vandals of severe  penalties, further increased the gap  between exchange  equipment and
transmission networks.
In addition to the low-level of coverage,  there was also a huge imbalance  between urban
and rural areas.  More than  80% of the main lines were in the largest cities, with 75%  of lines in
Lilongwe  (the capital)  and Blantyre  (the  largest  city).  Consequently,  as  in many  countries  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa,  there  were  very  few  telephones  in  the  rural  areas  where  more  than  78
percent of the population lived in  1998.  At this time,  the ratio of teledensity  in the largest cities
to teledensity  in the  rest of the  country  was around  124:1  in Malawi,  compared  to  an average
ratio of 5:1  in low-income countries (International  Telecommunication Union, 2001).8
11.3  Tariffs
Before the  1998  reform, tariffs were  specified in the Posts and Telecommunications  Act
of 1994 and the Posts and Telegraphs (Charges)  (Amendment) Regulations of 1996.  Even when
the tariffs were initially set in 1996, they were low by regional standards.  The charge for a three-minute local call, which was about US$0.08, was about 71  percent  of the  Sub-Saharan  African
average  (see  Figure  5)  in  1996.  However,  since  tariffs  were  set  in  nominal  terms  in  local
currency, prices fell rapidly over the next few years  due to high inflation  (see Table  1).  By the
end of  1998,  the  cost of a three-minute  call  had  fallen  to  about  US$0.03,  far  lower  than the
average for Sub-Saharan Africa (US$0.10).  In 1996, when the tariffs were  originally set, a three-
minute  long-distance  call  (320  KM)  cost  9  Kwacha  (US$0.59  in  1996).  Since  long-distance
tariffs were  also  set  in nominal  terms  in  local  currency,  they also  declined  over time  in real
terms, reaching US$0.21  for a three-minute  long-distance call by 1998. The cost of long-distance
calls in both monetary terms and relative  to the cost of local calls was low by regional standards
(see Table 2).
12  In  contrast,  international  call
rates  were  very high,  even by regional
10
standards  (see  Table  2).  In  1996,  a
8_  three-minute call to the United States or
6 s.  ~  Europe  cost  US$9.00  (see  Table  3).
D  4  This  was  also  especially  high  when
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Figure  5:  Cost  of a  Three-Minute  Local  Call  in  the  average  was  about  60  times  more
Malawi  and  Other  Sub-Saharan  Countries  (US¢Z,  for SSA (see Table 2).  Another notable
End of Year).
Note: Tariffs and exchange  rates are for end of year.  difference  between  local  and
Source: Data for Sub-Saharan Africa is from International Telecommunication
international  calls  was  that  the  1996
Act  set  international  rates  in  dollars  rather  than  Kwacha.  Consequently,  international  rates
remained high in real terms before reform, despite high inflation.
8 According  to International  Telecommunication  Union (1998b), the largest cities in Malawi had 6.18 main lines per
100 inhabitants in 1998  while  the rest of the country had 0.05  main  lines.  The average for low-income  countries at
this time was 5.67 main lines per 100 inhabitants in the largest cities and 1.09 main lines elsewhere.
12In  addition  to  specifying  local,  national  long-distance  and  international  call  rates,  the
1996 Amendments to the 1994 Law also set rates for calls from cellular phones  to fixed lines and
other cellular  phones  and  rates  for calls  from  fixed lines  to cellular  phones.  In both cases,  a
three-minute call cost 9 Kwacha (US$0.59 in  1996).  Since cellular rates were also set in Kwacha
rather  than  dollars,  the  cost  declined  in  dollar  terms  between  1996  and  1998  (see  Table  4).
Interconnection  fees  were  set  so  that  revenues  from  calls  that  required  interconnection  were
divided  evenly between  TNM and  MPTC  (i.e.,  each received  1.5  Kwacha  per minute)  (Zuze,
2001, p. 5).
In  1996,  the  connection  charge  for a fixed  line  phone was  Kwacha  1,000  (US$65)  for.
business  customers  and  Kwacha  700  (US$46)  for residential  customers.  In  comparison,  the
average  connection  charge  in  SSA  was  US$117  for  business  customers  and  US$98  for
residential  customers  (International  Telecommunication  Union,  2001).  Since  the  1996  Act
specified  rates  in Kwacha,  connection  fees declined  in dollar terms  over time,  reaching  about
US$22.79  and US$15.95  for business  and residential  customers  respectively  in  1998.  At  this
time, the connection  fee for a cellular phone  from TNM was Kwacha 950 (US$21.65).  Monthly
rental fees for fixed line phones were also relatively low in Malawi.  In 1996, the monthly rental
charge  for  both  business  and  residential  customers  was  Kwacha  80  (US$5),  lower  than  the
average  for  business  and  residential  customers  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (US$13  and  US$11,
respectively).
These  prices  suggest  that  MPTC  operated  several  levels  of cross-subsidies  prior  to
reform.  First, as noted above,  the connection  charge  for business customers  was higher than the
connection charge for residential customers,  although the difference was small by the mid-1990s.
Second,  before prices  were reformed in 1998,  MPTC's international  tariffs, which were pegged
to the US dollar, appeared high relative to local tariffs even by regional standards (See Table 2).
In  addition  to  these  cross-subsidies  between  different  classes  of service,  MPTC  used
telecommunication  services  in  general,  and  international  call  rates  in  particular,  to  subsidize
postal  services.  In  1996,  it  cost Kwacha  0.60  (about  US 40)  to  send a letter  within  Malawi
compared  to  costs  of about  8¢  in Zimbabwe  and  10¢  in Uganda,  Kenya  and Togo.  By  1999,
although  the  nominal  price  remained  the  same,  high  inflation  in Malawi  meant  that this  had
13fallen to about US  1.3g.  The low postal  tariffs,  combined with inefficient  staffing,  meant that
MPTC ran  a large deficit in postal services  - in FY  1999, it was estimated  that postal services
received  subsidies  of close  to Kwacha  165  million  (US$  3.6  million).9 In comparison,  total
revenues  from postal services were estimated to be only about Kwacha 70 million.
Even  before  the  1998  reform,  it  was  clear  that  MPTC's  policy  of subsidizing  other
services through high international  tariffs was not sustainable.  First, although callback was not a
significant  problem  in  1998,  because  incoming  rates  from  the  main  international  calling
destinations (the UK, the US and Germany)  were lower than outgoing rates,  it was thought that it
would  become a problem  in the  future.  The FCC's unilateral  decision  in  1997 to significantly
reduce  settlement payments  by US  carriers by 2002 meant that callback was likely to become a
greater problem unless  MPTC cut its international  rates.  Second,  Internet telephony (as well as
the ability  to  send  faxes  over the Internet  and to use E-mail  to replace  faxes)  also threatened
international  revenues  in the medium  term.  Although  Internet coverage  in Malawi was low - in
early  1998,  MalawiNet,  the  only  commercial  Internet  provider  at  that  time  had  about  800
subscribers  (Article  19,  1998,  p.  14)  - it  was  expected  to grow  quickly  in the medium  term.
Further,  in  a country  with only  36,000  telephone  lines,  even this low-level  of coverage  could
threaten  MPTC's  revenues.  Finally,  given that MPTC  charged  US$3.00/minute  to the United
States,  even GMPCS (Global Mobile Personal  Communications by Satellite) had the potential to
undercut  MPTC's  international  rates.  As  these  services  became  increasingly  available,  they
would  threaten  MPTC's  ability  to  charge  monopoly  rates  for  international  calls  and,
consequently,  would threaten the entire system of cross-subsidies.
[1[4  Commercial Activities
MPTC  did  not have  a proper  accounting  system  to compile  and produce  conventional
financial reports.  Instead it kept manual cash books to record receipts and payment,  preparing
income  and  expenditure  reports  from  these  books.  Before  MPTC  was  split,  it  had  never
9Field interview in October  1999 with the Post Master  General of MPTC
14produced  audited  financial  statements.10 In  1997/98,  Price  Waterhouse  produced  a separation
balance  sheet  to help divide assets and liabilities between  Malawi Telecom  Limited (MTL) and
Malawi  Postal  Corporation  (MPC).  However,  even  with  regards  to  these  figures,  Price
Waterhouse  noted that these figures (see Table 5) should not be considered  audited or auditable,
and  that no audit  opinion other than  a total  disclaimer  could be  expressed  with regards  to the
data.
This  said, however,  several  items on the  separation balance  sheet  are  interesting.  First,
liabilities  are  greater  than  assets,  suggesting  that losses  over  time  had  left  the  company  with
negative  equity.  Most of the  losses  were  concentrated  in  the  postal  sector.  Second,  debtors
owed the company a large amount,  net of provisions.  Based upon  1997 revenue  estimates from
the ITU, net of provisions,  debtors owed the  telecommunications  part of the company about  8
months  of telecommunications  revenues.  This  is  consistent  with  information  from  before
comnmercialization,  when collection rates also  appear to have been very low.  When MPTC was
first  commercialized  in  1995,  defaulters  owed  the  incumbent  operator  more  than  Malawi
Kwacha  63 million (equivalent of US$ 7.21  million),  of which the government  owed almost 70
percent. As soon as MPTC was  commercialized,  it issued ultimatums  to non-paying customers
and disconnected those who did not respond favorably as a first move to streamline  its activities.
This enabled  the company to recover MK17 million (equivalent of US$  1.95 million) from long
overdue accounts in just few months."'
10  According to revenue  and expense  data reported  to  ITU, MPTC's return  on  sales oscillated between  negative 2
percent in 1995 and  60 percent in 1997.  However,  given the absence of audited accounts, these numbers should be
treated with considerable  caution.
South African Business Intelligence, #59, February  1995.
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Source:  International Telecommnunication Union (2001).  declined  from  US$1,400  in  1992  to
US$386  in  1995  with the depreciation  of the Kwacha,  which declined  by 325  percent  over this
period.  On  average,  Malawi's  revenue  per main  line was  about  80 percent  of the  average  for
Sub-Saharan  Africa.  This suggests  that relatively  low  tariffs  resulted in  low  revenue  per main
line,  aggravating  MPTC's  poor  performance.  However,  revenue  per  main  line  increased
significantly  after commercialization,  increasing to US$877  in  1998,  and almost caught  up with
the  SSA  average,  which  had  been  falling  over  time.  The  rebound  in  revenue  after
commercialization  was  due to traffic  and tariff increases and the pegging of international  tariffs
to US$.
16II.5  Productivity
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Figure 7: Main Lines Per Employee.
Source:  Intemanonal Telecommunication  Union (2001)  number  of  lines.  per  employee  had
Note: Data for Sub-Saharan  Afnca (SSA) excludes South Africa.  more  than  doubled  to  25  main  lines
elsewhere  in  SSA.  Furthermore,  the  average  for  SSA was very by international  standards:  in
1995, there were  134 main lines per employee in Latin America, 97 in East Asia, and 29 in South
Asia.  The  number  of main  lines  per  employee,  which  increased  to  16  by  1998,  appeared  to
recover following corporatization.  However, it remained far below the number for the other case
study  countries  and  far  below  the  average  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (34  main  lines  per
employee). 12
IIJ.  THE 1998 COMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR POLICY STATEMENT  AND LAW.
In  1998,  the  Government  of Malawi  enacted  the  1998  Telecommunications  Law  and
Policy, liberalizing many areas of telecommunications.  The 1998 Communications Sector Policy
Statement  (Ministry  of Information,  1998)  is  the  basis  for  the  ongoing  reform  process.  The
objectives are:
171.  To increase the number of working telephone  lines to not less  than 150,000 by the end of year
2003.
2.  To raise the quality of  service to international standards.
3.  To stimulate the provision of new services within Malawi.
4.  To reduce the price of telecommunications  services in real terms.
5.  To extend access to modem telecommunications services throughout the country.
6.  To open up the provision of  telecommunications  services to the private sector.
The  policy  statement  explicitly  stated  that  all  non-basic  services  were  open,  to
competition,  but envisaged a continuing monopoly  in basic  services  for at least five years.  The
changes included  allowing  entry by a second cellular company,  assigning a financial advisor to
give advice  about privatizing  MPTC  and considering  future  entry by a second national operator
(after the end of the exclusivity period), separating  postal services  and telecommunications,  and
introducing a new regulatory agency.  However,  the policy was not clear about the direction that
the country would be taking beyond this, particularly regarding Malawi Telecom (MTL) and the
basic service market.
111.1  Regulation  and Interconnection
The Policy Statement  and  Law set up a new regulatory agency,  which  was separate  from
the  ministry  and the  incumbent  (i.e.,  MPTC).  The regulatory  agency, Malawi  Communications
Regulatory  Authority  (MACRA),  was  established  in  1999  with  the  power  to  regulate
telecommunications,  broadcasting,  the  use  of radio  frequencies,  and  the  provision  of postal
services  throughout  Malawi.  The  duties  of the  regulator  included  promotion  of competition,
facilitation  of entry,  protection  of the  interests  of consumers,  and  promotion  of research  in
telecommunications.  The  regulator could be  financed through  license  fees,  fines collected  from
licensees,  grants,  donations,  funds  appropriated  by Parliament  or funds  borrowed  from  third
parties. Any borrowing by the regulator is subject to the approval of the Minister of Information.
12  Although  it is unclear  what  caused  the  improvement after  1995,  it appears  that,  at least  in part,  it  was  due to
retrenchment of ghost employees (i.e., ex-employees  who had died, retired or did not exist but to whom  checks were
still issued and then cashed by other people within the company).
18MACRA  is  headed  by  a  seven-member  board,  appointed  for  four-year  terms  by  the
President on the recommendation of the Public Appointments Committee. 1 3 The members  can be
removed  only  for  specified  reasons  (i.e.,  death,  bankruptcy,  failing  to  declare  conflicts  of
interest, physical  or mental  infirmity,  missing three consecutive  meetings and  expiration  of his
term  in office).'4 The  board  members  appointed  to  MACRA  were  primarily  from  the private
sector.'5 The  Minister  of  Information,  on  the  recommendation  of the  board,  appoints  the
Director  General  and  a  Deputy,  who  are  responsible  for  the  direction  and  supervision  of
MACRA's work and staff.16 Finally, MACRA  is expected to be independent  in the performance
of its functions.1 7
MACRA's  operations  fit  into  four  broad  areas:  (i)  advisory/information;  (ii)
regulatory/licensing;  (iii) frequency management  and (iv) training.  In its advisory role, MACRA
provides advice  to users,  operators  and the  government  and collects  and disseminates  relevant
communication  related  information  to  the public.  In  addition,  MACRA  is  responsible  for  all
licensing  and  regulatory  activities  in the telecommunications  sector,  although  the  Minister  of
Information  may  make  telecommunications  regulations  based  on  the  advice  of  MACRA.
MACRA  is also responsible  for radio  frequency planning,  allocating and coordinating  spectrum
use,  and  providing  communication  related  training  to  operators  and  others.  Table  6  lists
MACRA's  functions in full.
MACRA was given considerable power to exercise its functions.  It can revoke licenses if
the licensee  breaches  license  conditions.'8 It  can also  void interconnection  agreements  (within
28  days  of receiving  them),  may  issue  guidelines  for  interconnection  agreements  and  may
13 Telecommunications  Act 1998,  Section 7.
14 Telecommunications  Act 1998, First Schedule,  Section 1.
15  According to field  interviews  at the end of 1999,  the board members included  a lawyer,  an architect,  a banker,  a
retired journalist and a retired broadcaster.  There were, at that time, only two board members from the government.
16 T'elecommunications  Act  1998, Section 9.
17 T'elecommunications  Act 1998, Section 4 (3).
18  'elecommunications  Act 1998,  Section 22.
19impose its own terms and conditions for interconnection  if the parties fail to reach agreement.19
MACRA  can request operators to submit  relevant information  and can force operators  to adopt
any  standard  accounting  system.20 It  can  penalize  operators  for  various  acts,  including:  (i)
connecting unapproved  equipment to the network;  (ii) intentionally  intercepting,  interfering with
or  modifying  messages  sent  over  the  telecommunications  network;  and  (iii)  disclosing  the
content of messages.21
The  licenses  issued  to  the  cellular  operators  give  MACRA  additional  powers.  In
particular,  the  license  for TNM allows  MACRA  to  issue tariff regulations  and to  impose  tariff
controls if MACRA  suspects anti-competitive  behavior,  although the second provision  is not in
the  second  cellular  license.  Also,  the  regulator  can  fine  the  cellular  operators  if they  fail  to
comply with any stage of the license rollout obligations  (up to US$400,000, depending on actual
rollout performance  with maximum fines for each stage).
Furthermore,  the licensing  regime specified  in the  1998  Communications  Act gives the
regulator  considerable  discretionary  power to  unilaterally  modify  telecommunication  licenses.
In particular,  Section 23 of the 1998 Communications Act reads:
"23 - (1) [MACRA]  may modify any condition of a telecommunication  license in
accordance  with the provisions of the license or,  in the absence of such provision,
if it is in the public interest to do so.
(2) Before  modifying any condition  of a telecommunications  license,  [MACRA]
shall -
(a) Publish a notice  stating the reasons  for the  intended modification  and  giving
any person with an interest in the matter the opportunity  to make representation;
and
(b)  Give  due  consideration  to  any  representation  regarding  the  proposed
modification made to it by any person having an interest or holding an individual
license."
19Teleconuunications  Act  1998, Section 26.
20 Telecommunications  Act  1998, Section 30.
21 Telecommunications  Act  1998, Section 97.
20Since  MACRA  is financed through license  fees, fines,  grants  and donations  received by
the  Authority,  sales  of  assets  and  appropriations  from  Parliament,  it  appears  to  be  largely
financially independent of the Ministry.  However, the Minister of Information  has considerable
ability  to  interfere  with  the  regulator's  decisions.  In particular the  Minister  can  issue  written
directions to MACRA on how the Authority  should carry out its duties, at least when requested,
and can issue new regulations.22
The Communications  Act allowed operators  to enter into interconnection  agreements  on
their own, provided  that they  file them with MACRA.  As noted above,  however,  MACRA  can
reject any terms of interconnection  agreements within twenty-eight  days of being notified.  If it
decided to reject any terms, the parties to the agreement are given another chance to renegotiate
based on MACRA's  guidelines.  If the parties  can still not come to an agreement,  MACRA can
determine the terms and conditions for interconnection  at the request of either party.
IIle2  Competition and Privatization.
In  addition  to  establishing  MACRA  as  a  sector  regulator,  the  1998  Communications
Sector Policy  Statement also  advocated  splitting  MPTC  into two parts  and partially privatizing
the new telecommunications  company,  Malawi Telecom Limited (MTL).  The policy states that
MTL should find a 'strategic partner'  to help them tap into international  capital markets.  It was
envisaged  that  the  partner  would  make  an- initial  investment,  transfer  technological  and
commercial know-how  and initiate a training program.  The policy also allowed for the sale of a
partial  interest in MTL through an initial  public offering.  The second major change was that the
Government  decided  to  license  a  second  cellular  operator  to  compete  with  TNM,  the
incumbent's  subsidiary.  Finally,  the  policy envisaged  that other  telecommunications  services
would  be  liberalized.  In  particular,  although  Internet  Service  Providers  (ISPs)  would  need
licenses,  there were no restrictions on the number of licenses that would be issued.
22 Section 32 of the 1998  Communications  Act reads "The Minister,  on the advice of the  Authority, may from time
to  time  make  regulations  governing  the  operation  of  telecommunications  networks,  the  provision  of
telecommunications  services  or  the use of terminal  equipment.  Section  16  (1) reads  'The  Authority may,  where
necessary,  seek the general direction  of the Minister as to  the manner  in which it is to carry  out its duties under this
part.  (2) any direction given by the Minister under subsection (1) shall be writing."
21In other respects,  the reforms were  less ambitious.  First, although the Policy advocated
partial privatization of MTL through the identification of a strategic partner, the policy stopped
short of advocating full privatization  (i.e., the sale of a controlling  stake in the enterprise).  The
description  of  a  'strategic  partner'  could  describe  arrangements  ranging  from  between  a
management contract  combined with a small  equity holding  to  full privatization.  During  field
interviews,  it was clear that some disagreement  about the precise meaning of a 'strategic partner'
remained.  Second,  although the policy says that a second cellular license would be issued, it was
unclear  how  much  competition  would  be  introduced  in  the  cellular  market.  During  field
interviews, Celtel,  the company  that was  awarded the  second cellular  license,  claimed  that the
Government  had agreed not to issue any additional cellular licenses for at least five years after it
started  operating.23 Third,  the  incumbent  operator  was  allowed  to  retain  monopolies  over
international  and  fixed-line  services  for  at  least  five  years  after  the  separation  of postal  and
telecommunications  services  and internet service providers were required to lease lines from the
incumbent operator.  Fourth, MTL was not required to divest its holdings  in MalawiNet or TNM.
Finally,  MTL was awarded a five-year exclusivity agreement,  from the date of its incorporation,
apparently  ruling  out  competition  in local  fixed-line,  long  distance  and  international  services
over this period.  The  Policy and Act  did not  oblige  the Government  to open these  sectors  to
competition after the five-year period was complete.
IIV.  POLITICAL  CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING IREFoRM
In  many  ways,  the  reform,  as  envisaged  in  the  1998  Communications  Sector  Policy
Statement and Law, was quite ambitious.  Further, it was accomplished as part of a larger reform
program covering all areas of communications  including politically sensitive areas such as radio
and  television.  However,  the  plans  were  modest  compared  to  the  more  ambitious  reforms
attempted  in other case-study  countries  (e.g., in Ghana  and Uganda).  Further,  the  reform was
enacted  later  than  reforms  in other  countries  in  SSA,  including most  of the  other  case-study
countries.  In this section,  we discuss  what motivated reform,  how the  government  overcame
opposition,  and why the planned reform was less extensive than in the other case  study countries.
23  These claims  were  later repeated  in the  intemational  and local  press  (see, for example,  Economist  Intelligence
Unit, 2001a, p. 38)
22IV.1  Factors Motivating Reform
Several  factors,  including  the poor performance  of MPTC,  broad bipartisan support  for
reform,  pressure  from  donors,  and technological  and regulatory  changes  that were  taking place
throughout the region, increased pressure for reform.  In this sub-section  of the paper, we discuss
each of these factors in tum.
Poor Performance of Malawi Post and Telecommunications  Corporation  (MPTC).  As
in  most  of the  other  case  study  countries,  one  of the main  motivations  for  reform  was  the
extremely poor performance  of the incumbent  operator.  Telephone  penetration  was lower (see
Figure  1), coverage was growing more slowly (see Figure 2), and productivity was far worse (see
Figure 7) than the averages  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  In addition,  service  quality  was poor and
service outages were common.  By 1998, when reform was finally implemented,  many observers
were  concemed  that  Malawi's  poor  infrastructure  was  irnpacting  foreign  investment  and
economic  growth.  Foreign enterprises operating in Malawi ranked inadequate infrastructure  as a
larger constraint on doing business in Malawi than they ranked  any of 15  other policy  areas in
1997.24  In comparison,  corruption was ranked as a larger problem than infrastructure  in  15 of 22
Sub-Saharan African countries, taxes in  12 of 22 countries,  and crime in 8 of 22 countries.  In an
additional  question,  firms  were  asked  how  long  it took to  get  a public  telephone  line.  The
average estimate  for Malawi was the third highest among the 22 Sub-Saharan  African countries
for which data was collected.25
MPTC's control  over the telecommunications  sector and its ability to restrict competition
in several potentially competitive  areas where  it owned the main company (i.e.,  in cellular and
24 Data is from the  1997  WDR Private Sector Survey collected for World Bank (1997).  In this survey,  enterprises
were asked  to judge  on  a six-point scale  how problematic  several  different  policy areas were  for doing business.
The questionnaire  asked about  15 areas, including  regulations,  price controls,  corruption, inflation,  crime and theft
and terrorism.  The  Sub-Saharan  African  survey covered Benin, Cote d'Ivoire,  Cameroon,  Congo,  Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Mali,  Mozambique,  Mauritius,  Malawi,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  Chad,  Togo,
Tanzania,  Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
25 The question was "How long does it take to get a public telephone line connected?"  with firms asked to respond
on a 1-6 scale  with I being less than  I month, 5 being more than I year and 6 being 'difficult to say'.  Responses  to
this  question should be treated with some caution since  a disproportionate  number of 6's might make comparisons
difficult.
23Internet  service)  meant  that  MPTC  had  strong  reason  to  resist  liberalization.  However,  in
practice,  MPTC's  inability  to  attract  sufficient  funds  for  investment  further  weakened  its
position.  For example,  although TV Malawi  was officially part of the MPTC, MPTC was unable
to raise the  funds  to start operations  before  reform.  Similarly,  MPTC's  failure  to significantly
expand  rural  service  meant  that  the  predominantly  rural  population  of Malawi  was  mostly
unserved,  giving  them  little  reason  to  support  MPTC.  Further,  significant  investment  was
needed to upgrade Malawi's telecommunications  infrastructure  at the time of reform.  According
to  estimates  made  by  consultants  reporting  to  the  Taskforce  in  charge  of developing  sector
strategy  and  drafting policy  documents,  perhaps  as much as  US$300-400  million  was needed  if
MPTC  were  to  reach  150,000  lines  by  2003.  It would  be  difficult  to  achieve  this  level  of
investment  without  significant  investment  from  the  private  sector,  especially  since  donors
required  liberalization  and privatization  of the  sector  before  they  would  provide  assistance.
Consequently,  it appeared  unlikely that  MPTC  would  be able  to  improve  sector performance,
especially  in rural areas, without significant  liberalization.
Broad Bipartisan  Political  Support for Reform.  Although  in practice  it did not end up
being  a  major  problem,  one  thing  that  could  have  potentially  deterred  reform  was  that  the
Government  did  not have  a strong  majority  in  the  National  Assembly.  In  1994,  after a long
period  of single  party  rule,  Malawi  held  presidential  and  parliamentary  elections.  In  sharp
contrast  to most other  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  the  incumbent,  Dr.  Hastings  Kamuzu
Banda, was defeated by his opponent, Bakili Muluzi.26 However,  Mr. Muluzi's party, the United
Democratic Front (UDF)  failed to win a parliamentary  majority.27 Initially,  this forced the UDF
into a coalition government with another party, the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD).  After the
26 Between  independence  in  1964 and democratization  in  1994,  a single party, the Malawi  Congress Party  (MCP),
ruled Malawi.  Following the end of the cold war,  internal pressure  from strikes and riots and external pressure  from
donors convinced  President Banda  to consider  returning the  country to  a multi-party  system.  In a referendum  on
June  14,  1993,  63 percent of the  electorate  voted  for a return  to democracy.  Newell (1995)  describes the process of
democratization  in Malawi
27  In the May  1994 elections,  the United  Democratic  Front (UDF) won 84 seats,  the Malawi Congress Party (MCP)
won 55 seats and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) won 33  seats.  Other parties and independents  won 5 seats.
24coalition  broke  up in June  1996,  the UDF managed to gain  a slight majority through defections
and by-elections.28
The UDF's  slender  and unstable  majority  in the National  Assembly  meant that  reform
effectively  had  to  have  some  support  from  either  independent  members  of  the  National
Assembly or members of the opposition.  In practice, this does not appear to have been a major
constraint.  During field interviews, many observers involved in the process  stressed that both the
Government and the opposition supported telecommunications reform and, in fact, that members
of the opposition originally proposed the bill.
The bipartisan  nature of telecommunications  reform  reflected the  fact that t  he costs  and
benefits  of reform accrued to both the government and the opposition.29 This is primarily due to
the  strong regional  voting  patterns  in  Malawi.  During both the  1994  and  1999  elections,  the
UDF  dominated  the  south,  which  includes  Blantyre,  the  largest  city,  the  opposition  Malawi
Congress  Party (MCP) won most of the center region,  which includes the capital,  Lilongwe, and
AFORD  was triumphant  in the north  (see Table  7 and Table  8 for election results in  1994  and
1999  elections  respectively),30 Although  MPTC  is  based in Blantyre  and  about  45  percent  of
coinections  were  there  in  1998,  MPTC  also  had  a  significant  presence  in Lilongwe,  which
accounted for 30 percent of connections.  Although the UDF won three of five seats in the city of
Lilongwe,  and  all the seats  in  Blantyre  in the  1999 parliamentary  election,  the MCP won two
28  Initially  the  UDF  managed  to  keep  a  working  majority  by  allowing  five  AFORD  ministers  to  keep  their
ministerial  positions in return for their continued support.  However, in by-elections in  May  1997,  it won four of
seven contests  giving  it 89 (of 177) seats, a  slight majority.  By September  1998,  2 deaths resulted  in it losing this
majority.
29  There  was  far  more  controversy  over the  part of the  Communications  Bill  concerning  broadcasting  and the
Malawi  Broadcasting  Corporation  (MBC).  Because  Malawi  is primarily  rural  and has  a high  rate of illiteracy (40
percent),  radio is far more important than newspapers  in reaching  the population.  Since  MBC was the  only station
allowed  to  broadcast  news,  and  all  other  stations  were  either  apolitical  or  reportedly  controlled  by Government
supporters  (Economist Intelligence  Unit,  1998), the Government  was far more concerned about this aspect of reform
than it was about telecommunications  reform.
30  Before  Independence  from the United  Kingdom,  the administrative  capital had  been  located  in Zomba,  in  the
southern  region.  However, following  Independence,  President Banda  had moved the capital to Lilongwe, which was
located  close to the center of the country  and was in a region dominated by the Chewa,  the ethnic  group to which he
belonged (Kaspin,  1995, p.  604).
25seats in Lilongwe and all of the seats  in the surrounding district.3'  Because all parties have both
urban and rural  constituents,  the benefits of liberalization (e.g.,  improved service), which would
initially be felt in urban areas,  and the costs (e.g., job losses),  affected both the Government and
the opposition.
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Figure 8:  Rural Population in  1998 (as percent of total)  require  license  holders  to  provide
Source:  World Bank (2002).
service  in rural  areas  (Law,  Section
21a).  This  has been true even  for cellular companies.  For example,  the licenses  issued to the
first two cellular companies, MTN and Celtel, required that the companies (i) expand coverage to
over 50 district,  trading and tourist centers;  (ii) provide  service  10  km on either side  of 5 major
trunk  roads;  and  (iii)  provide  160  community  service telephones  in  rural  areas.  The  licenses
layout a 60-month schedule for expanding service and the companies are required to pay fines of
up to US$400,000 if they failed to meet these requirements.
31  One  factor  that might  have  affected  the  1999  vote  compared  to  the  1994  vote was  that  the  civil  service  was
located primarily  in Lilongwe.  The large number of civil service layoffs  and the small  pay increases that followed
democratization  might have made the  UDF relatively more  unpopular in the  1999 vote  in Lilongwe.  For example,
in  1997,  civil  servants  went on strike  for seven  weeks to try to get  larger  pay increases,  although they eventually
backed  down.  However,  the reverse  might have also  been  true,  if the  UDF had tried to place  its supporters in the
civil service.  In  addition,  President  Muluzi  apparently  tried  to  pressure  civil  servants  to  vote for the  UDF.  For
example,  the  Economist  Intelligence  Unit  (1998)  reported  that in  a speech  in  southern  Balaka district  on  June  7,'
1998,  President Bakili Muluzi  wamed that civil servants  should support the ruling United Democratic  Front (UDF).
They report that he said 'Remain where  you are and eat your neutral professionalism.  My government  is a political
government.  Unless you identify yourself with the UDF, you will get nothing from me.'
26Support  for  reform  from
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Figure  9: Overall Surplus/Deficit (as % of GDP)  factor  encouraging  reform.  This
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putting conditions  related to sector reform in loans and grants and offering aid following reform.
Malawi's  high level of budget deficits, which averaged  over 5  percent of GDP including grants
and  12  percent  of  GDP  excluding  grants  between  1995  and  1999,  made  the  Government
especially susceptible  to pressure from donors (see Figure 9).32.
After  the  Government  had  passed  the  1998  Communications  Act,  the  Danish
International  Development  Agency  (DANIDA),  which  was  the  donor  agency  most  heavily
involved  in sector reform,  provided  financial  assistance  to the Government  to help  it with  the
reform  process.  This  aid  was  used  to help  establish  the  Malawi  Communications  Regulatory
Authority  (MACRA),  to  hire  consultants  to  advise  on  the  separation  of MPTC  in  Malawi
Telecom and Malawi Posts, and to develop rural telecommunications.
32  In  addition  to  pushing  hard  for  telecommunications  reform,  donors,  including  DANIDA  who  were  providing
considerable  support  for  telecommunications  reform,  resisted  proposals  to  separate  broadcasting  reform  from
telecommunications  reform.
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in  only  8 countries  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa, only 4 countries  had privatized their incumbent operators,  only 7 countries had a cellular
operator  that was  not  at  least  partially  owned  by the  incumbent  and  only  2  had  introduced
competition in cellular (see Figure  1O).
However, by 1998, Malawi had started to lag behind the leading reformers.  By this time,
34  countries  had  separated  postal  services  from  telecommnunications,  20  had  separated  the
regulator from both the ministry and the incumbent,  10 had privatized the incumbent operator,  16
had  a  cellular  company  not  even  partially  owned  by  the  incumbent,  and  14  had  introduced
competition  in cellular  telephony.  Further, many other countries  that had not yet implemented
reform were in the process of doing so.  In addition, it was becoming clear that MPTC lacked the
resources  and human capital to keep up with the rapid pace of technological  change.  Combined
with  its  poor performance  in other  areas  (i.e.,  the  slow  system  expansion),  this  made  policy-
makers  feel  like they  were  being  left behind  in a rapidly  evolving  field.  In  turn,  they were
concerned  that Malawi would be put at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis its neighbors.
28As  discussed  previously,  technological  change,  which  resulted  in  the  1999 tariff reform,
significantly reduced  MPTC's  ability to rely upon revenues  from  international  services and, in  so
doing, reduced opposition to reform.  Price reform made liberalization of Intemet services  easier by
reducing  the  likelihood  that  Internet  telephony,  which  remained  inferior  in  quality  to  standard
telephony,  would  significantly  reduce  MPTC's  revenues.  In  addition,  the  drop  in  international
prices reduced  MPTC's ability to finance  expansion of domestic and  rural services from  revenues
from international services, making alternate sources of financing more important.
The  rapid  transformation  of  the  telecommunications  sector  elsewhere  in  Africa
influenced reform  in Malawi  in several  ways.  First, since bilateral and multilateral donors were
involved  in many reforms  in  other countries  throughout  the  region, donors  had  started to  gain
valuable experience  conceming  the implementation  and  likely benefits  of reform.  This  meant
that donors were gradually becoming more concerned  about the absence of reform in Malawi.  In
addition,  the  wave  of  liberalization  also  meant  that  policymakers  could  observe  reform  in
environments  that were relatively  similar to Malawi.  In July  1997,  the Reform Task Force went
to several other countries  in Africa, including Ghana, Zimbabwe,  Tanzania  and South Africa, to
assess the effect of reform  on sector performance  in these countries.  Seeing how other countries
designed  their  sector  reforms  and  how this  impacted performance  made  it easier for the  Task
Force  to  evaluate  the  likely  benefits  of reform  in  Malawi  and  to  assess  how  political  and
technical difficulties could be overcome.
IV.2  Factors Working Against Reform.
Although  poor performance  at  the sectoral  level  is usually  necessary  for reform,  it has
often  been  insufficient.  For  example,  in  this  study,  despite  the  fact  that  MPTC  had  been
performing  very  poorly  for  over  a  decade,  the  government  enacted  only  very  minor  reforms
before  1998.  Although  the  experience  with  reform  throughout  the  region  and  technological
change  resulted  in increased  pressure,  other  factors worked  against reform.  In this section, we
discuss some of these factors to describe possible reasons why the reform was more modest than
the more ambitious reforms attempted in several of the other case study countries.33
33  See, for example,  the case studies for Ghana (Haggarty et al., 2003) and Uganda (Shirley et al., 2002)
29A  Relatively  Stable Macroeconomic Environment.  Recent  studies  have  found  that
sector reforms are more likely when sector problems are combined with a macro-economic  crisis
(see,  for example,  Shirley  and  M6nard,  2002).  Although  the  macroeconomic  environment  in
Malawi was  difficult in some  respects in the mid-1990s,  Malawi  was not suffering from a major
macroeconomic  crisis.  Inflation  had  accelerated  in  1995,  reaching  83%,  but  had  slowed
considerably  by  1998  (see  Figure  11).  Furthermore,  after  a decade  of unstable,  but generally
modest  economic  growth  (averaging
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Figure  11: GDP Growth and Inflation in Malawi,  1995-2001  was far from a crisis situation, reducing
Source:  World Bank (2002) pressure  for  immediate  and  radical
sector reform.
Weak  support from  domestic  enterprises.  Although  domestic  private  enterprises
generally  felt that Malawi's poor infrastructure was an obstacle to their competitiveness,  pressure
from  this  source  was  considerably  less  important  than  pressure  from  other  sources  such  as
donors.34 Although private sector  entities tended  to view the reform  favorably,  few,  including
those broadly  involved in the communications  sector,  seemed to have played  a very  active role
34 This  is also in contrast  to the  experience  in other case-study  countries.  For example, pressure  from  the private
sector was one of the driving forces for reform  in Senegal (Azam et aL, 2002, p.  19)
30during  the reform  process  (Field Interviews,  October  1999).  For  example,  the  Taskforce  that
was formed to develop sector strategy and help draft the policy documents originally  consisted
only of people  from the public sector  (Article  19,  1998, p. 27).35  Further,  when members of the
public  were  invited  to  submit  written  submissions  suggesting  changes  to  the  draft  policy
document  and  Bill,  few  entities  other  than  the  World  Bank  and  some  government  officials
actually did (Article  19,  1998, p.  27).36  Consequently,  although  private  individuals  and firms
might  have  benefited  significantly  from  reform,  most  were  not  actively  lobbying  for  it  and
pressure  from the private sector does not appear  to have been one of the forces driving sector
reform.
In  part,  the  low level  of pressure  exerted by  private  enterprises  probably  reflects  the
relatively modest role of the private sector in the non-rural sector of the economy and the relative
importance of agriculture in  Malawi,  which accounted  for 40 percent of GDP  in  1998.  Before
democratization  in  1994,  the  non-rural  sector  of the  Malawian  economy  was  dominated  by
public  enterprises  and  a  few  large  semi-private  enterprises.37 For example,  the massive  Press
Corporation  Limited (PCL),  which had links  to President Banda prior to  democratization,  was
thought to account for as much as  30 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s (Economist Intelligence
Unit,  1996).  Although  progress  with  privatization  has  reduced  the  influence  of state-owned
economy,  many  enterprises  remain  publicly  owned  and  the  government  retains  significant
35 The task force  was comprised  of two people  from  MPTC,  one from  the post office,  one  from  TV Malawi,  one
from the Privatization  Commission,  the Law Commissioner,  one from the Attomey  General's Chambers,  one from
the Ministry of Finance, and one from the Ministry of Information (Article  19, 1998, p. 27).
36 In part, the lack of private sector involvement may reflect  the impression that suggestions  from non-govemment
entities were  generally being ignored.  For example, during  field interviews  (October  1999), one non-govemmental
organization  noted  that a  group of NGOs  submitted  comments  and recommendations  to the Taskforce  related to
reform  of radio  and  television  rather  than  telecommunications.  However,  when  their  recommendations  were
ignored, they became frustrated with the process.
37 Forexample,  Sahn et al. (1990) note that 'Malawi's industrial sector is characterized by high concentration ratios
that suggest both  the  exacerbation  of inefficiencies  and development  of monopoly  rents.  For  example,  8 of 21
subsectors at the three digit level ISIC classification have less than three firms."
31influence  over other enterprises  such as PCL.38 Consequently,  enterprises  in the private  sector
did not end up being an effective voice in support of reform.
Concern about the fiscal cost of supporig  postal service.  As  discussed  in greater
detail  above,  although  telecommunications  were  not  a  'cash  cow'  in  Malawi,  MPTC  did  not
appear  to  be  a major  drain  upon the  budget either.  Furthermore,  although  the poor quality of
MPTC's accounts meant  that it was impossible to draw any conclusions about its profitability,  it
was  widely  believed  that  profits  from  MPTC's  telecommunications  services  financed  large
losses associated with the provision of postal services.  One fear, therefore, was that if postal and
telecommunications  services  were  separated  and  then  MTL  privatized,  that  Malawi  Posts
Corporation  (MPC)  would  become  a  major  burden  on  the  Government's  already  troubled
finances.
Opposition  from Management and Workers of  MPTC. Although the weak support from
the private  sector, the lack of a macroeconomic crisis,  and concerns  about the cost of supporting
MPC  tended  to discourage  reform,  the  main sources  of opposition  were  the  management  and
workers of MPTC.  Although overstaffing was less pronounced in  1998 than it had been in  1995,
when  Pyramid  Research  ranked  MPTC  as  the  most  inefficient  telephone  company  in  Sub-
Saharan  Africa (Economist  Intelligence Unit,  1999b), it remained a problem.  One concern was
that privatization might lead to a significant number of layoffs and, consequently,  workers  were
opposed to reform.  The  most visible  sign of opposition  was vandalism  of MIPTC's  lines and
equipment.  For example,  in August  1999, MPTC  lines in Blantyre were vandalized resulting  in
10,000  customers,  including  the  city's  banks  and  airport,  being  temporarily  being  cutoff
(Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  1999b).  Although  vandalism  might have been the result  of the
38  Although  in  1997 President Banda lost control of the Press  Trust Corporation  after a lengthy legal battle, control
was  awarded  to  a  trust  established  to  benefit  all  Malawians.  In  practice,  this  appears  to  have  resulted  in  the
government having a great deal of influence over the company.  For example,  following the appointment of a former
finance  minister  to  chair of the  company  over the  objections  of the  PCL board,  the  Economist  Intelligence  Unit
(2002,  p. 28) wrote:  "In business  circles, it has been  tacitly acknowledged  that this  exercise shows that PCL is not
after all a company  in the private  sector,  but remains  a parastatal,  despite  being quoted on  the  London and Malawi
Stock Exchanges."
32theft of copper cable  in some  cases, several parties suggested that-workers  might be responsible,
especially when the vandalism involved non-copper lines (Field Interviews,  1999).39
In  addition  to  opposition  from  workers  in  the  telecommunications  sector,  the  poor
perfornance  of the postal  service and  the high level  of subsidies  from  telecommunications  to
postal  services  meant  that  there  was  also  opposition  from  postal  workers.  To  reduce  this
opposition,  the  Government  took  several  steps.  First,  all  employees  of MPTC  whose  duties
related to either telecommunications  or postal services were given the right to transfer to Malawi
Telecom  Limited (MTL)  or the Malawi Post  Corporation (MPC) when MPTC was split apart.40
Second,  although prices were raised to reduce  MPC's deficit,  the government  agreed to provide
subsidies to  MPC following  the  split (World Bank,  2000).  Together,  these actions  reduced the
likelihood of significant layoffs.
However, as noted by the Post-Master General, there was no direct evidence linking workers to the vandalism.
40 Teleconmunications Act,  1998, Section  72 and Section  84.
33IV.3  Credibility of Reform Process
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Figure  12:  Perceptions  of  investment  risk  in  case  study
countries  (Intemational  Country Risk Guide)  discretionary  powers;  it  was  only
Source:  International  Country Risk Guide,  modestly
Note:  Score is calculated  on a ten-point scale,  equally weighting risks related  insulated  from  politcal
to  contract repudiation  by government,  expropriation by government,  rule  of
law, corruption and bureaucratic quality.  For 1999,  PRS changed the scoring  pressure;  and it had not yet established
system.  Scores  for the likelihood  of contract  repudiation  and expropriation
were rolled  into a general  index  related to investor confidence.  For the  1999  a  track  record  regarding  its  regulatory
measure,  we  replace  contract  repudiation  and  expropnation  with  'investor
confidence',  which received  twice the weight in the aggregate measures.  The  performance.
large increases for Malawi (and Uganda)  are visible if we restrict the index to
include  only  the  three  other  measures  (i.e.,  corruption,  rule  of law  and
bureaucratic  quality).  See Knack and  Keefer (1995)  for a description  of the
ICRG measures.  However,  other  factors  worked
in  Malawi's  favor.  Although  Malawi
ranked lower on the International  Country Risk Guide, than the early reformers in the other case
studies  (e.g.,  Ghana,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  and  Tanzania)  in  1994,  perceptions  of risk  in  Malawi
improved  significantly following  democratization.  In fact,  by 1999, Malawi  was ranked higher
(i.e., as less risky) than any of the other case study countries except Uganda (see Figure  12).  One
area where Malawi ranked favorably is on 'law and order tradition',  which measures the ICRG's
assessment  of the  strength  and  impartiality of the  legal  system  and  its assessment  of popular
observance  of the  law.  Since  the  democratization  process  began  in Malawi,  Malawi's  have
courts ruled  against the government in several high-profile  cases.  For example, before the  1999
elections,  the  Electoral Commission  ruled  that  the  presidential  candidate  for  the  two  main
opposition parties, the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP)
could  not  run  under  a  single  banner.  However,  the  courts  ruled  against  the  Electoral
34Commission  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  1999a).  Similarly,  after  the  National  Assembly
banned  the  MCP  leader from  the Assembly  for  one  year  for boycotted  parliamentary  sessions,
the High Court of Malawi overtumed the ban.41
V.  IMPACT OF REFORM ON SECTOR ORGANIZATION  AND PERFORMANCE
V.1  Institutional Changes
Although  the  1998  Communications  Sector Policy  advocated  the issuance  of a  second
cellular  license,  the Govemment  actually  started  the process  of doing this before  it issued  the
Policy.  To  offer a second  license,  the  Govermment  first had to re-negotiate  the allocation  of
spectrum  with  TNM,  which  had  been  allocated  the  entire  GSM900  band  in  its  provisional
license.  Further,  since the  negotiations  for the  second  license  preceded  the  establishment  of
MACRA  and the  1998  Communications  Act,  the  license  had to be bid under  the  earlier  1994
Telecommunications  Act and was offered by the Ministry of Information  on the recommendation
of the Post Master General,  the head of MPTC.
An  advertisement  for bids  for a  second  cellular  license  was  put into  the  national  and
intemational press  in March  1998.  In addition to the amount to be paid for the license and radio
frequencies,  the bidders  were  asked  for details  on network  development plans, quality  services
targets, public pay phone targets,  schedule for network coverage,  the shareholding  of the bidders,
and  provisions  for  Malawian  involvement.  From  the  first  round  of bids,  the  government
committee selected six bidders  and proceeded to negotiate over expansion plans, license fees and
other areas.  The committee then ranked the candidates,  reducing the list first to three candidates
and  then  to  a  single  candidate.  The  committee  then  reported  its  choice  to the  Minister  of
Information,  after which the Privatization Commission entered detailed  license negotiations  with
the winning bidder.
The  fifteen-year license was awarded to Celtel Limited on December 25,  1998.  Celtel is
80  percent owned  by Mobile  Systems  International  (MSI)  of the  United  Kingdom,  10  percent
41  Pan Aftican New Agency,  "Malawian  Parliament at Odds with Judiciary",  September  30, 2000.  As discussed
below,  a recent report by the International  Bar Association  (2002)  suggested that the independence  of the judiciary
35owned by the  Malawi Development  Corporation  (a Malawian parastatal holding company)  and
10  percent  owned by Indebank  (a  second  Malawian  parastatal).  MSI  has extensive  cellular
operations  in  other  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  including  in  Uganda,  Zambia,  Gabon,
Congo-Brazzaville,  Guinea, Chad, and the Democratic Republic  of Congo.
Following the negotiations with Celtel, the Commission proceeded to negotiate a similar
fifteen-year license with TNM.  Both companies pay the regulatory authority three license fees: a
lump  sum of US$  100,000  per annum,  US$  4,000 per  duplex  channel  per annum,  and  a levy
equal to 5 percent of annual audited operating revenue.
Prior  to  starting  operations  in  October  1999,  Celtel  negotiated  an  interconnection
agreement with MPTC  (March  1999).  It reached  agreement with TNM at about the time that it
started operations.  At the same  time, TNM renegotiated its existing interconnection  agreement
with MPTC,  setting the same interconnection rates between MPTC and TNM as had been agreed
between  Celtel  and  MPTC.42 These negotiations,  which  preceded the  formation of MACRA,
were  completed  without any involvement  from the regulator.  The outcome  of the negotiations
was broadly  favorable  to the cellular companies,  who received  US$0.20  from  MPTC  for calls
terminating  in their networks but paid only US$0.05  to MPTC  for calls terminating in MPTC's
network (Zuze, 2001, p. 5).
Although, as  discussed below, the introduction  of a second cellular operator resulted in a
rapid expansion of cellular service,  cellular tariffs and tariffs for calls from MPTC  to the cellular
networks  increased  significantly  following  the  issuance  of  the  second  cellular  license.  In
response to the large price increases,  MACRA tried to pressure Celtel and TNM to reduce prices
and  interconnection  fees  after  MIACRA  became  fully  operational.43 After  failing  to  get  the
companies  to  agree  to  this,  MACRA  declared  the  interconnection  agreements  between  the
companies  null  and  void,  unilaterally  replacing  them  with  a  Sender-Keeps-All  (SKA)
arrangement.  The new interconnection  regime was particularly unfavorable  for Celtel.  First, as
had been compromised  in recent years.
42 Based on field  interviews with staff at Celtel, TNM and MPTC.
43,"Malawi  to Commission Third Cell-phone Network"  Panafrican News Agency (September 2,  2000).
36noted  previously,  interconnection  fees  were  four times higher  for calls  originating  in MPTC's
network than they were for calls originating in Celtel and TNM's networks.  Second,  since Celtel
primarily operated  a pre-paid system,  charging high per-minute  charges  but no monthly service
fees  (see Table  9),  Celtel  had  a particularly  large  imbalance  of 10  incoming  calls  for every
outgoing  call  (Zuze,  2001,  p.  5).  In contrast,  TNM primarily  operated  a  post-paid  system,
charging a monthly fee  in addition to per-minute charges suggesting that the imbalance  was  less
important for TNM.  Finally, although the SKA arrangement was also unfavorable  for TNM, it is
important to note that it was favorable  for MTL, one of TNM's main shareholders.  In summary,
the new interconnection regime imposed by MACRA was particularly unfavorable  for Celtel.
In  response  to  MACRA's  announcement,  Celtel  filed  a  lawsuit  against  MTL  and  the
regulator,  asking for an injunction to prevent the new regime from being enacted.  This resulted
in a lengthy legal battle between MACRA, MTL and Celtel, lasting into 2002.  Furthermore, the
imposition  of the  SKA  arrangement  also resulted  in  disagreements  between  TNM and Celtel,
with the two companies  suspending  interconnection  agreements  for a period in 2001,  making it
difficult  to  call  between  networks  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  2001a,  pp.  37-38).  On
December  5, 2002,  MACRA  announced  a  new  interconnection  regime  that would result  in a
US$0.08 per minute  interconnection  charge  on mobile-to-mobile  and fixed line-to-mobile  calls
and  a US$0.05  per  minute  charge  on  mobile-to-fixed  line  calls.  It was  reported  that Celtel's
managing  director  said that he was  happy with this  outcome,  although  the chief executive  of
TNM was reportedly less favorable  towards it.44
The  disagreement  over  interconnection  agreements  appears  to  have  also  affected  other
po)icies.  In an apparent retaliatory move  against  the injunction  filed by Celtel against the new
SKA  arrangement,  the  regulator  announced  that  it  was  considering  licensing  a  third  cellular
operator.  One-third  of the GSM 900 band remained  unused after the Celtel's entry,  making it
possible  for the regulator  to issue  additional  licenses  without having  to renegotiate  frequency
allocations.  MACRA  claimed  that issuing  an additional  license  would  promote  competition,
improve efficiency,  and lower the cost of service.  Neither the 1998  Communications  Act nor the
44  "Telephone  firms differ on MACRA ruling" by Ayam Maeresa,  The Nation (December  10, 2002).
37Communications Sector Policy Statement ruled out the licensing of additional cellular companies
- although  they  also  did  not  include  any  provisions  explicitly  advocating  the  issuance  of
additional  licenses.  However, the management  of Celtel claimed that during license negotiations
the government  promised that no  additional cellular  licenses would  be issued for sixty months
after Celtel's entry (i.e., before October 2004).5  MACRA, however,  argued  that the agreement
was not legally binding."
MACRA  eventually initiated  the bidding process  for a third fifteen-year  cellular  license
in  2001.  Bidding  was  closed  on  February  7h  2002.  Three  bids  were  received  from  three
consortium  headed  by  Ubambo  Investment  of  South  Africa,  Globe  Investment  Limited  of
Malawi  and Xantium Trading  of South  Africa.  The  license was  awarded  in May  2002 to  the
consortium  headed  by  Ubambo  Investment.  The company,  Malawi  Mobile  Limited,  had not
started operating by the end to 2002, but was expected to do so in early 2003.
45There  is no mention of this in Celtel's license.  During field interviews  in 1999, the second operator claimed that
the government  had put this  commitment  in writing.  The Pan  African  New  Agency reports that,  in a statement
issued on September 8, 2000, Celtel's managing  director said that the government had offered  a written undertaking
that only two cellular  operators  would be  allowed to  operate  for five  years after Celtel  started operating  (PANA,
"Malawi's Celtel unhappy with decision to license third operator, September  11,  2000).
4"Malawi's  Celtel unhappy  with  decision to  license  third  operator"  Pan-African  News  Agency  (September  II,
2000) and "A third cellular phone license is awarded'  (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002)
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Figure  13: Estimated Internet Users in Malawi.
MACRA  had  approved  about  15
Source:  International  Telecommunication  Union (2001).
licenses and there were 10 operational
ISPs (Ministry of Finance  and Economic  Development,  2001).  The increase  in the number of
licenses  coincided with a massive increase in the number of Internet users in Malawi, from about
500 at the end of 1997 to 20,000 by the end of 2001  (see Figure  13).47
In addition to expanding competition  in Internet and cellular services, and despite the fact
that  the  Communications  Sector  Policy  Statement  did  not  require  full  privatization,  the
Government  quickly  initiated  plans  to privatize  the  telecommunications  operations  of MPTC.
The  first  step  towards  doing  so  was  splitting  MPTC  into  two  companies,  Malawi  Telecom
Limited  (MTL)  and  Malawi  Postal  Corporation  (MPC).  Malawi  Telecom  Ltd.  (MTL)  was
corporatized  on May 31, 2000.  Under the  1998 Communications  Sector Policy, it was given five
years exclusivity in fixed-line and international  services.
47  According  to  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economic  Development  (2001),  the  10  operational  ISPs  had  4,400
subscribers by mid-2001.  However,  it is important to note that several users could use each individual subscription.
For  example,  Ministry  of Finance  and  Economic  Development  (2001)  notes  that  several  Intranets,  including the
Malawi  Government  Wide  Area  Network,  MTL,  and  the  Limbe  Leaf  Tobacco  Company  had  only  a  single
subscription.  At that time,  the Malawi Govemment Wide Area Network alone had 450 active users.
39As noted previously,  although the  1998  Communications  Sector Policy had provisions  for
Malawi  Telecom  to  seek  a  'strategic  partner'  and  discussed  the  possibility  of  a  partial
privatization,  the  policy  does  not  explicitly  advocate  full  privatization  (i.e.,  the  sale  of a
controlling  interest in the  enterprise).  By early 2000, however,  the Government  appeared to be
moving towards  full privatization  of MTL, agreeing to do this by June 30,2001  as a condition of
the World Bank supported Privatization and Utility Reform Project (World Bank, 2000, p. 19).
As a first  step towards  privatization,  the Government  appointed Robert  Fleming  Limited,
an international  consulting firm from Zimbabwe, as the Financial Advisor for the privatization of
MTL  in  early  2000.  Subsequently,  an  Information  Memorandum  was  issued  to  potential
investors in December  2000.  About  15 potential bidders, including firms from Germany,  South
Africa,  Holland,  India  and  Malaysia,  were  short-listed  to  make bids  for a stake  in MTL.  A
deadline for final bids from potential bidders was set for 18 June 2001.
Although  the  progress  in  the  first  half of the  year  suggested  that  at  least  a  partial
privatization  of MTL should  be completed  some  time in 2001,  the privatization  attempt  veered
off-course  at this point.  On July 23,  2001,  the  Government of Malawi  announced  that it was
suspending the entire privatization  program, including the privatization of MTL.  Although there
was considerable confusion  about the reason for the suspension of the program,  it was reported
that one reason  was  that the Government  was  disappointed  in the bids  that it had  received for
MTL  (Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  2001b).  After  considerable  pressure  from  donors,  the
Government resumed the privatization program in November 2001.  Following resumption of the
program,  the  Privatization Commission  requested  revised bids from  the two consortia  that had
submitted final bids in the first round: one made up of socially-owned Press Corporation Limited
(PCL)  of Malawi  (see  footnote  38)  and Econet  Wireless  of South Africa  and a second  led by
Telecom  Consultants India Limited.
Following  the  submission  of  second  round  bids  on  January  18,  2002,  the  Press
Corporation/Econet  consortium  was  designated  as  the  preferred  bidder.  At  this  point,  the
Government  appointed Price Waterhouse  Coopers  (PWC) to assess  the capacity  of consortium.
However,  after the due  diligence report  was undertaken,  Econet  decided  to withdraw from  the
40consortium.  According  to  press  reports  one  of the  unresolved  issues  at  the  time  the  Press
Corporation/Econet  consortium was designated preferred bidder was the issue of pricing.48
The  planned  privatization  of  MTL  had  important  interactions  with  two  other  sector
policies:  the issue of additional cellular  licenses and the licensing of a second network operator.
The  announcement  that  MACRA  intended  to  solicit  bids  for  a  third  cellular  license  had  an
indirect  impact on the planned privatization  of MTL due to  its implications  concerning  MTL's
relationship with TNM.  In particular, prior to this, it was unclear whether MTL would receive a
license to operate  its own cellular network, presumably  divesting its part ownership of TNM,  or
would  instead  retain  part  ownership  of  TNM  following  privatization.  The  joint  venture
agreement  allowed MTL to increase  its  shareholding  of TNM  to  51  percent,  giving it majority
ownership of the cellular  operator.  However,  with  the issuance  of a third  cellular license,  it is
unclear  whether the  first option remains  open since  this would  imply that there would  be four
cellular licenses.
Although  the  1998  Communications  Sector  Policy  allowed  the  Government  to  decide
whether or not to issue a license for a second national fixed line network,  it explicitly gave MTL
a initial  five-year exclusivity period starting from the date that MTL was incorporated (i.e., until
May  31,  2005)  for fixed-line  and international  services  (Ministry of Information,  1998,  p. 20).
However,  after starting the privatization  process  for MTL,  the Government  decided to consider
licensing  a second  network  operator,  possibly  doing so before the  five-year  exclusivity period
was  complete.  These  plans,  however,  appear  to  have  been  put  on  hold  until  after  the
privatization of MTL was.completed.  Although the Government had given MACRA permission
to issue a license to second fixed line license by early 2002, MACRA reportedly planned to do so
only after completing  the privatization  of MTL and issuing a third cellular license.49 Given the
delays in privatizing MTL,  it appears unlikely that a second operator will be operational  before
the end of the five-year exclusivity period.
48 See "Govemment  Assesses  MTL Investors  Capacity"  The Malawi Nation (June 3,  2002).  According to a Reuters
News Report  from Factiva Select, the consortium bid US$16 million for an 80 percent share, but was offered  only a
30 percent stake (Malawi to Remarket State Telco After Sale Collapse by Denis Mzembe (November 25, 2002)).
49 See "MACRA under Fire"  The Malawi Nation (February  16, 2002).
41Another area of concern is whether MACRA will manage to operate  independently  from
short-term  political  pressures.  As  discussed  earlier,  some  provisions  appear to  give  MACRA
some degree of independence.  For example,  its does not rely upon the government  for any part
of its revenues - which  come entirely from  license fees (and  some initial  support from donors).
However,  other  provisions  appear  to  give  the  Government  considerable  influence  over
MACRA's  decision-making  powers.  For example,  the  Minister of Information  is able  to issue
written  instructions  to the regulator,  a power that he  has been used even  in the early  years of
MACRA's  operations.
Furthermore,  the government  appears to interfere with MACRA in ways that do not seem
consistent  with  the  spirit of the  1998  Telecommunications  Act.  For example,  the Government
has interfered with MACRA's  board on several occasions. The first Board was appointed in May
1999,  during  the  preparations  for the  1999  elections.  However,  following  the  elections,  the
board was dismissed,  along with the  boards of all parastatals.  Although the  dismissal was  not
due to any specific  actions by MACRA, it doe not appear that the dismissal was consistent with
the allowable reasons  for dismissing board members  specified in the  1998 Telecommunications
Act.  A new  board,  primarily made up  of private  sector participants,  was  appointed in August
1999.  However,  this  board  was  also  dismissed  the  following  year.  The  Government's
willingness  to  dismiss  boards,  seemingly  in  ways  not  fully  consistent  with  the  1998
Telecommunications  Act,  suggests  that  the  Government  will  continue  to  have  considerable
influence  over MACRA's board in the near term.
42V.2  Prices
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Teleconmunicutions  act and MTL's webpage (www.mtl.malawi.net).  Kwacha  (US$0.27  at  end-1998)  to  24
Kwacha  (US$0.52  at end-1999).  However,  prices  for local and long-distance  calls were  set in
Kwacha  and  since  they  were  not  adjusted  after  1999,  rapid  inflation  in Malawi  (relative  to
inflation  in  the US)  has  resulted in a drop  in tariffs  in real terms.  By 2000, they had  reached
levels  in US$  similar to the levels that they had been  at before re-balancing.  Prices  for long-
distance  and local calls were  adjusted downwards by an additional 6.25 percent in 2002.
At  the same time that call  prices were  adjusted,  connection charges  were increased  and
the difference in fees between business and residential customers was eliminated.  For residential
customers connection  charges  were increased  from by 72 percent,  from K700 to K1200  and for
business  customers  they  were  increased by 20 percent.  The  monthly rental  charge,  which  had
already  been  re-balanced  in  the  early  90s,  was  also  raised  by  20  percent  to  Kwacha  100
(US$2.15 at end-1999).  Once again, inflation quickly eroded these increases.  In  fact, by the end
of 2001  the monthly subscription rate was lower in real terms than it had been at the end of 1998
(see Table 4 and Table  10).
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Source:  Price  data  for  Malawi  is  from  1996  amendments  to  the  1994
Telecommunications  act and MTL's webpage (www.mtlonhne.com).  as local  calls have.  The  re-balancing
significantly  lowered  the ratio of international  to local tariffs, which fell from  159:1  to 35:1  and
the ratio of international  to domestic  long-distance  tariffs  from  27:1  to  5:1  at  the end of 1999.
As discussed previously in section  11.3,  this comprehensive  tariff re-balancing  decision seems to
have been partly caused by competitive  pressures  from  Internet  telephony,  potential  future  call
backs, and potential GMPCS telephony.
The introduction of competition in cellular telephony did not result in reduced prices  for
calls from cellular phones.  Prior to reform,  a three-minute  call from  a TNM cellular phone to a
fixed line phone cost about US$0.21  (see Table  4).  However,  when Celtel entered the Malawian
market,  it set its pre-paid  prices considerably  higher  than the TNM's  prices.  Further,  because
Celtel  set  its prices  in  US  dollars  rather  than  Malawi  Kwacha,  prices  remained  high  in  dollar
terms  despite  the  high  level  of inflation  in  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s  (see  Table  1 for
inflation rates in Malawi over this period).  A three-minute call  from Celtel's network to a fixed
line phone on MTL's  network cost US$1.05  during peak hours  (7AM  to 6PM),  US$0.90  during
off-peak hours (6PM to  1OPM),  and US$0.60  during discount hours (1OPM  to 7AM).  Although
Celtel did not have a monthly subscription  fee for its pre-paid  service,  the monthly subscription
fee  for  TNM  was  relatively  modest before  reform  (about  US$6.84  per month  in  1998).  The
44connection  fee (US$30.00)  was also  similar to the  lowest  connection  fee  for a post-paid  TNM
phone (US$21.65  in 1998).  In June  1992,  a month before the third cellular  license was awarded,
Celtel  cut its  per  minute  tariffs  by  up  to  43  percent  (see  Table  2).  However,  Celtel's  prices
remained  higher  in  dollar  terms  even  after  these  cuts  than  TNM's  prices  had  been  prior  to
reform.
As  discussed  previously,  prior  to  reform,  TNM's  prices  were  set  under  the  1996
amendments  to the Post and Telecommunications  Act of 1994.  Since the  1996 Act set prices in
Malawi  Kwacha,  prices  declined  significantly  in  dollar terms  between  1996  and  1998  (from
US$0.59 in  1996 to US$0.21  in  1998)  due to high inflation,  which resulted in the devaluation of
the Kwacha  over this period.
In  contrast  to  the  1996  Amendments,  the  1998  Telecommunications  Act  did  not  set
prices.  Consequently,  although Celtel and TNM's licenses, which were issued in  1999, allowed
the  regulator to  issue  tariff regulations  and  required  companies  to notify  the  regulator  when
setting tariffs, TNM  had much greater  flexibility  to set rates  following  the reform.  TNM took
advantage of this change to revise its tariff structure.  For its post-paid service, it increased tariffs
so that a 3-minute  call  to  its own network  or the network of MTL would  cost US$0.45  and a
three-minute  call to Celtel's network would cost US$0.75  (see Table 9).  It also adjusted its other
charges,  reducing  connection  fees  from  Kwacha  900  (US$21.65  in  1998)  to  Kwacha  450
(US$5.60  in 2001).  The monthly  subscription rate remained  at Kwacha  300 (US$6.84  in  1998
and US$4.46  in  2001).  For  its  pre-paid  service,  which  it  introduced  after Celtel  entered  the
market with its pre-paid  service,  a three-minute call to its own network or the network of MTL
cost US$0.45 while a call to Celtel's network cost US$0.75.
V.3  Access
One  of the  key goals of reform  was  to increase  coverage.  The  1998  Communications
Sector Policy specified a goal of increasing the number of telephone lines from 35,000  in 1998 to
150,000 by 2003.  This goal was  later revised to  180,000 in Malawi Telecom's  license,  which
was  issued  in June  2000.  To  help  Malawi  achieve  these  expansion  goals,  the World  Bank
approved the Privatization and Utility Reform Project,  which was intended to provide resources
for preparing  state-owned enterprises,  including Malawi  Telecom, for privatization.  In addition
45to requiring the divestiture  of a controlling interest in Malawi Telecom by June 2001,  the project
also had an additional  requirement  that MTL would  increase the number  of working telephone
lines to 150,000 by the end of 2004 (World Bank, 2000).
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Figure  16: Total Telephones in Operation in Malawi  intended  progress  with  privatization,
Source: Intemational Telecommunication  Union (2001)  this  suggests  that  Malawi  Telecom
might  not  meet  the  ambitious  goals  specified  in  the  1998  Communications  Sector  Policy
Statement and the 2000 Privatization  and Utility Reform project.
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Note. Data for Sub-Saharan  Afrnca (SSA) excludes South Africa  Despite this expansion,  it is important
to  note  that  growth  in  cellular
subscribers  in Malawi has lagged behind growth in other countries  in SSA.  In 1998, the number
of cellular  subscribers  per  100  inhabitants  in  Malawi  was  close  to the  average  for  SSA  (see
Figure  17).  By 2001, despite the growth in Malawi, Malawi was lagging far behind the average.
There  are  several plausible  reasons  for the large  increase  in subscribers  that  occurred
despite the large tariff increase.  One reason might be that Celtel introduced  several services that
made  cellular  service  more  attractive  to  potential  users.  In particular,  Celtel's  introduction  of
pre-paid  service, in addition to being more attractive to some users, allowed potential customers
to subscribe to cellular  service without having to meet the stringent conditions (e.g., related  to
credit)  that post-paid customers  needed to meet  to qualify  and does  not require them  to pay  a
deposit.50 However,  the introduction  of pre-paid  service does not appear to be the only reason
for the expansion - about 30 percent of Celtel's customers and 70 percent of TNM's customers
subscribed  to post-paid services  at the end of 2001  (EMC, 2002,  pp. 25-26).  Another possible
explanation might be that the introduction  of competition  might have encouraged TNM to invest
50 In  1998, TNM required a Kwacha  1500 deposit (about US$34).
47more  quickly  than  it would  have  otherwise  to  avoid  losing  market  share.  Finally,  it  seems
plausible  that the low Kwacha  prices specified in the  1996 Amendments  to the  1994 Act might
have placed supply-side  constraints  on system expansion.  Under the low prices  set in the  1995
Amendments,  TNM might have had little incentive to invest in new technologies  (e.g., to offer
pre-paid  service) and  facilities,  resulting in supply  side constraints  on service.  By allowing  the
cellular  providers  to  charge  higher  rates,  the  reform  might  have  removed  these  constraints,
resulting in the expansion of service to areas  and consumers who would not have been profitable
prior to reform.
It  seems  likely  that  cellular  service  will  continue  to  expand  in the  near  future.  The
introduction  of the  third  provider  should  increase  competition,  giving  the  providers  greater
incentive  to quickly  expand  service.  Further,  it  is likely to  result  in  lower prices  - as  noted
previously  Celtel reduced  its per minute charges by up to 43 percent following the award of the
third license - increasing  demand for cellular service as it become affordable  to a greater number
of people.
VL  CONCLUSIONS
When  compared  to  the  other  case  study  countries,  Malawi  adopted  a  relatively
conservative  approach  towards  reform.  The  two  main  accomplishments  were  splitting  the
former  state-owned  monopoly  in  postal  services  and  telecommunications  (MPTC)  into  a
telecommunications  enterprise  (MTL) and a postal monopoly (MPC) and issuing two additional
cellular licenses.  In addition,  the Government  also set up a new regulatory agency separate from
both the incumbent operator and the Ministry of Information and liberalized entry in value-added
and Internet  services.  However,  more  ambitious  reforms,  such  as privatizing  MTL,  allowing
entry by a  second  national  network  operator  or licensing regional  fixed  line  operators, had  not
been completed by 2003 - five years after the reform process  started.
In  part,  the  modest  reform  reflects  the  modest  internal  support  for  sector  reform  in
Malawi.  Several factors reduced  demand for significant  changes in sector organization.  First, in
the absence  of a macroeconomic  crisis, reform  did not appear to be urgent.  Second,  managers
and  workers  at the  incumbent operator,  which was overstaffed  and  inefficient,  were  opposed to
reform.  Third,  the  telecommunications  operator  was  supporting  postal  services,  which  was
48losing  considerable  amounts  of money  before  reform.  Consequently,  the  government  was
concerned  that  privatization  of telecommunications  would  leave  it  the  unprofitable  postal
corporation,  which could prove  to be a significant drain on government  finances.  Finally,  there
was only modest support for reform from the private  sector.  Because the Malawian economy is
predominantly  rural,  support  for  telecommunications  reform  was  relatively  muted.5'
Furthermore,  support from the non-rural private  sector was also modest - the Government,  state-
owned enterprises, and the socially owned Press Corporation Limited  (PCL) dominated much of
the  non-rural  economy.  Consequently,  according  to  most  observers,  donors  (especially
DANIDA  and  the  World  Bank)  were probably  the most  important  group  lobbying  for sector
reform.  Although  donor  pressure  alone  is  unlikely  to  define  a  reform  agenda,  pressure  from
donors can provide reformers  with needed support.
The modest reform resulted  in modest gains.  Although the introduction of competition  in
cellular  telephony  resulted  in  growth,  it was  not  as rapid  as it  was  in countries  that reformed
more  aggressively.  Furthermore,  cellular  prices  increased  dramatically  as  soon  as  they  were
freed.  Finally,  although the fixed-line system  expanded, penetration  grew more slowly than was
originally hoped, despite aid from donors that helped finance system expansion.
There  have also been  some  problems  associated  with the credibility of the  regulator.  A
first  problem  is  that  the  1998  Communications  Act  gives  the  Minister  of  Information
considerable  power  over the regulator.  Given  that  the regulator  has wide-ranging  powers  that
allow it to modify licenses,  void interconnection  agreements,  and interfere  in the sector  in several
other ways, the lack of independence  appears to be a concern.  In addition to concern  about the
effect that  the  1998  Act might  have on regulatory independence,  these  is also evidence  that the
Goveniment  is able to apply pressure in other ways.  Most importantly, the regulator's board has
been replaced  twice since MACRA  was  fonmed - something  that does not appear consistent with
provisions of the 1998 Communications  Act.
5  Clarke and Wallsten (2002) provide  data on rural telecommunications  throughout  Africa.  Even by the  late-1990s,
fewer  than  I percent  of rural  households  had a telephone  in 14  of  15  countries  in Africa  for  which  data  were
available.
49The regulator's  public disagreements with Celtel, which have been played out in both the
Malawian  court  system and the  local and international  press, have also damaged  its credibility
with potential  investors.  This was especially  damaging since at the time of the  disagreements,
Celtel  was  the  only  majority  privately  owned  telecommunications  operator  in  Malawi.
Consequently,  even  though  the  regulator's  actions  might  have  been reasonable  and appear  to
have  successfully  reduced  prices  in  the  cellular  market,  they  have  probably  reduced  the
regulator's credibility.  It is likely that this deterred potential  investors from taking an interest in
MTL when MTL was up for privatization,
In  part  these  problems  reflect  the  ordering  of  reforms.  Because  the  Government
auctioned  the  second  license  before  the  regulator  was  operational,  the  regulator provided  no
input when  MTL and  the cellular  companies  made the disputed  interconnection agreements  or
regarding the Government's commitment not to issue a third cellular license.  If the regulator had
been operational,  these disagreements may have been avoided in the first place.  However,  given
the  questions about the independence of the regulator  and the  Government's potential ability to
involve itself regulatory decisions, it is difficult to conclude that these problems would have been
completely avoided even if this had been the case.
Although the Government reported that it intended to put MTL back up for sale after the
collapse of the  first attempt, privatization  will probably be difficult  in the near term.  First, the
global economy appears less favorable with respect to investment in telecommunications  in 2003
than it did in 1998 and international  telecommunications  companies have considerably  less cash.
Second,  Malawi's  credibility  with  outside  investors  has  probably  fallen  in  recent  years.  In
addition to the sector-related  problems that have reduced  the regulator's credibility,  Malawi  has
had wider problems with governance and corruption.  For example,  there have been several high
profile corruption  cases and a recent report by the International  Bar Association questioned the
independence  of the judiciary  and  the  public  prosecutor  and  noted  concerns  that freedom  of
expression and association has been curtailed  (International Bar Association, 2002).  As a result
of these recent changes,  Malawi  ranked lower on the International  Country Risk Guide in 2002
that  it did in  1999 (with  its score  falling  from 6.7/10  to  5.5/10 - see footnote  to Figure  12  for
details on calculation).  This will probably reduce the price that investors will be willing to pay
for MTL, making privatization more difficult.
50Two  other  changes  might  also  reduce  pressure  for  reform.  First,  after  DANIDA
suspended support to the Malawian  Government in 2002 and other donors refocused their efforts
on measures more directly linked to poverty reduction, donor pressure  is unlikely to be as great
in the near future  as it was  in the past.  Second,  the rapid expansion  of cellular telephony  has
improved  MTL's  financial  performance  and raised  expectation  regarding  its  valuation.  This
makes privatization  more difficult,  since it will probably make Government decision makers less
eager to strike  a deal with  potential  investors.  As noted previously,  several  reports  suggested
that one reason  for the  first failed  attempt  at privatization  was that the govermment  felt that  the
investors offered too little for the company.
Although this suggests reason for concern, these delays might not end up being damaging
in the medium term.  By the time MTL is eventually privatized, the regulator will have had time
to  build  up  a  more  solid'r egulatory  record  - something  that  should  improve  the  country's
credibility  with  potential  investors.  This,  in  turn,  should  improve  the  price  paid  and  the
conditions of the privatization  contract.
Based upon the experience  in Uganda and Ghana,  it might make sense to license a second
network operator  sooner rather  than later.  In Uganda, where  the second  network  operator  was
licensed before the incumbent  firm was privatized,  the second network operator had time to build
a customer base before it found itself competing  with  an aggressive, privatized  operator with a
large installed  base of customers.  This allowed  a competitive  framework  to develop  (Haggarty
et al., 2003).  In contrast,  in Ghana,  the incumbent was  privatized first,  allowing  it to put much
greater pressure on the new operator before it could establish itself (Shirley et al., 2002).
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54VIII.  TABLES
Table  1: Inflation  and GDP growth in  Malawi,  1994-2001  (annual%).
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
GDP growth  -10.2  16.7  7.3  3.8  3.3  4.0  1.8  2.8
GDP per capita growth  -11.7  14.9  4.7  1.4  1.0  1.8  -0.3  0.7
Inflation,  consumer prices  34.6  83.3  37.6  9.1  29.7  44.9  29.5
Inflation,  GDP deflator  26.2  81.2  58.9  7.8  25.4  42.2  25.1  26:1
Source:  World Bank (2002).
Table 2: Tariff Comparison of Selected  African Countries  (US$ per 3 Minutes,  1997).
National
International  to  Long  Local  International as  International as  NLD as  % of
USA  Distance  Call  % of NLD  % of Local  Local
(320KM)
Ghana  3.12  1.08  0.06  289  5,200  1,800
South Africa  2.85  0.75  0.08  380  3,563  938
Zimbabwe  4.83  0.45  0.20  1,073  2,415  225
Botswana  5.16  0.78  0.06  662  8,600  1,300
Namibia  6.36  0.57  0.05  1,116  12,720  1,140
Senegal  6.63  0.48  0.10  1,381  6,630  480
Uganda  6.90  1.71  0.20  404  3,450  855
Kenya  7.50  1.32  0.05  568  15,000  2,640
Malawi  9.00  0.42  0.06  2,123  15,929  750
Zambia  9.60  0.51  0.08  1,882  12,000  638
CAR  9.81  8.07  0.19  122  5,163  4,247
Cameroon  9.90  1.20  0.10  825  9,900  1,200
Tanzania  10.80  0.72  0.30  1,500  3,600  240
Average  7.11  1.38  0.12  515  6,057  1,177
Source  Communications Technology Handbook,  1998; and Malawi Telecom  Ltd.
Table 3: Per Minute International  Call Rates  for MPTC,  1996-2002.
___________________________________  1996-1998  1998-2002
Standard Rate  $3.00  $1.20
United States, Canada  Cheap Rate  $2.75  $1.00
Standard Rate  $3.00  $1.20
Europe  Cheap Rate  $2.75  $1.00
Standard  Rate  $1.00  $0.50
COMESA  Cheap Rate  $0.90  $0.40
Source:  Posts and Telecommunications  Act,  1994 and MPTC
55Table 4:  Prices for MPTC and TNM Before the 1998 Reform
Malawi Post and  TNM Malawi
Telecom  (Fixed)  (Mobile)
Connection Fee
Business  $22.79  $21.65
Residential  $15.95  $21.65
Monthly Subscription
Business  $1.82  $6.84
Residential  $1.82  $6.84
Three Minute Local Phone Call
To Fixed Line (MPTC)  $0.03  $0.21
To Mobile (TNM)  $0.21  $0.21
Source:  Posts and Telecommunications  Act,  1994 and TNM  Flyers.
Table 5: MPTC Balance Statement,  FY  1998.
Asset  Post  Telecom  Consolidated
Current Asset  76,607,182  1,184,107,669  1,259,714,851
Cash on hand  25,840,925  23,613,547  49,454,472
Debtors  38,561,217  416,345,622  454,906,839
Stores  11,205,040  27,127,172  38,332,212
Interdivisional  Balance  0  717,021,328  717,021,328
Fixed Asset  105,271,926  1,058,129,252  1,163,401,178
Investments  0  28,568,473  28,568,473
Total Asset  181,879,108  2,270,805,934  2,452,684,502
Liability & Capital
Current Liabilities  1,019,087,899  475,992,818  1,495,080,717
Trade Creditors  14,566,525  107,697,821  122,264,346
Other Creditors  32,208,314  228,256,436  260,464,750
Current Portion of LTD  0  140,038,561  140,038,561
Amounts due to Malawi Savings  Bank  255,291,732  0  255,291,732
Interdivisional Balance  717,021,328  0  717,021,328
Long Term Debt (LTD)  0  1,636,276,510  1,636,276,510
Accumulated  P (L) Net of Starting Capital  (838,208,791)  158,536,066  (679,672,725)
Total Liability & Capital  181,879,108  2,270,805,394  2,452,684,502
Source.  MPTC Account Separation Report,  by Price Water House. As of March 31,  1998
56Table 6: The Functions of the Regulatory Authority
1.  To keep under review the carrying on within and outside Malawi of activities  connected with
communications.
2.  To collect and to publish  information with respect to commercial activities  connected with
communications.
3.  To provide advice to users and providers of communication.
4.  To sponsor the provision of, and where  necessary to provide  training in activities  related to the provision
of communication  services.
5.  To give information,  advice and assistance to the Minister with respect to any matter which concerns the
provision of communication  services.
6.  To investigate any matter which is related to the provision of communications  services or to the use of
radio frequencies  and which is the subject of a representation  to the Authonty.
7.  lTo regulate the provision of telecommunications  services through  licensing, providing advice to the
Minister,  and monitoring the activities of licensees for compliance.
8.  To draw up numbering plans  for public communication networks.
9.  To ensure the adoption of intemational  standards.
10.  To establish a type approval regime  for terminal equipment.
It.  To regulate broadcasting  services through licensing, providing advice to the Minister, and monitoring
the activities  of licensees  for compliance,
12.  To plan the use of radio frequencies and make frequency allocations.
13.  To carryout and co-ordinate frequency assignments.
14.  To monitor radio emissions and deter interference  with authorized  radio communications.
15.  To regulate postal services through licensing, providing advice to the Minister, and monitoring the
activities of licensees  for compliance.
Source:  1998 Telecommunications  Act.
Table  7: Regional  distribution  of votes in 1994 presidential elections
Regional  United Democratic Front  Malawi Congress Party  Alliance for Democracy
Distribution  (Mr. B. Muluzi)  (Dr. H. K. Banda)  (Mr.  C. Chihana
Nordt  4.5%  7.2%  86.6%
Center  27.1%  62.7%  7.3%
Soutlh  76.6%  15.8%  5.1%
Note: Totals  do not sum to 100%  since votes for the Malawi Democratic Party and null and void ballots are excluded
Source:  SNDP website  (www.sndp.org.mw).
Table  8: Regional  distribution  of votes  in 1999 presidential elections
Regional  United Democratic Front  Malawi Congress Party/
Distribution  (Mr. B. Muluzi)  Alliance for Democracy
(Mr.  G Chakuamba)
North  9.3%  87.3%
Centcr  34.5%  61.1%
South  77.1%  18.1%
Note: Totals do not sum to 100%  since votes for candidates of three smaller parties and null and void ballots are excluded
Source:  SNDP website  (www.sndp.org.mw).
57Table 9: Post-Reform  Prices for Cellular Service (in US$).
Ceigel
TNEW  (  -2002)  (After July 2002)
Pro-Paid  Post-Paid  Pro-Paid  Pro-Paid  Post-Paid
Monthly Subscription  $0.00  $4.46  $0.00  $0.00  $15.00
Three-Minute Phone Call
Peak  $0.69  $0.45  $1.35  $0.87  $0.60
To MTL  Off-Peak  $0.69  $0.45  $0.90  $0.60  $0.45
Discount  $0.69  $0.45  $0.60  $0.45  $0.45
Peak  $0.69  $0.45  $1.35  $0.87  $0.72
To MTN  Off-Peak  $0.69  $0.45  $0.90  $0.60  $0.45
Discount  $0.69  $0.45  $0.60  $0.45  $0.45
Peak  $0.75  $0.75  $1.05  $0.60  $0.45
To Ceitel  Off-Peak  $0.75  $0.75  $0.75  $0.45  $0.45
Discount  $0.75  $0.75  $0.45  $0.45  $0.45
Source:  Celtel (www.mw.celtel.com)  and TNM (www.telekommalawi.com)  websites  and brochures.
Note: Prices are set in US$ for all services except for post-paid subscription  fee for TNM.  Fee is set at EC300 for a Simcard and
K150 . Dollar amount  is calculated  using end of 2001  exchange  rate.  Peak is  7AM to 7PM,  Off-Peak  is 7PM  to  10PM  and
Discount is  IOPM-7AM.
Table 10: Post-Reform Prices for Malawi Telecom Limited (MTL)
Kwacha  US$
(End-2001)
Monthly Subscription  100  $1.49
Three-Minute  Phone Call
Local  Peak  4.8  $0.07
Off-Peak  3.2  $0.05
Inter-Regional  Peak  12  $0.18
Off-Peak  8  $0.12
National  Peak  24  $0.36
Off-Peak  16  $0.24
To Cellular  Any Time  16  $0.24
Source: MTL website (www.mtlonline.com).
Note: Prices are set in Malawi Kwacha.  Prices in US$ are for the end of 2001.  Prices for phone calls were  adjusted downwards
by 6.25 percent in 2002.
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